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Altered States: A Comparison of
Separation of Powers in the United
States and in the United Kingdom
By JAMES G. WILSON*
Introduction
The United States Supreme Court has never adequately explained
why it fluctuates between "formalistic" '1 and "balancing"' 2 resolutions of
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University;
B.A., Princeton University, 1969; J.D., University of Chicago, 1974. The author thanks Steve
Steinglass, Maijorie Kornhauser, and Mimi Lord. The Cleveland Marshall fund provided
some assistance.
1. The Court has employed formalistic approaches to strike down the legislative veto,
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), to limit the grounds Congress can invoke for excluding a
newly elected Congressman, Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), to prevent Congress
from appointing principal executive officers, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (Comp-
troller General administering budget deficit reduction plan), Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976), and to hold that the legislative privilege does not apply to statements made in press
releases and newsletters, Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). A congressional stat-
ute will prevail, undisturbed by any balancing test, against challenges based upon the Tenth
Amendment. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruling
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Note that one can advocate formal doctrine or balancing tests without being wedded to
any particular interpretive vision. For instance, this Article examines a foreign constitution to
help justify formal rules.
The Court recently rejected a delegation claim in Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co.,
109 S. Ct. 1726 (1989) (upholding statute authorizing Secretary of Transportation to create
system of user fees). The delegation doctrine, however, is not completely dead. The Court has
never overruled the cases establishing the doctrine. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Wayman v. South-
ard, 23 U.S. (19 Wheat.) 1 (1825). Professor Schoenbrod has proposed that the Court prevent
Congress from delegating any of its "legislative powers." Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doc-
trine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1223, 1251 (1985). Professor
Currie has put the issue less abstractly: "Congress may not leave the fundamental policy deci-
sions to others." Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 Sup. Cr. REv. 19, 28.
2. The Court engages in balancing tests to assess congressional power to make appoint-
ments of inferior officers, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), to allow administrative
agencies to decide Article III cases, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833 (1986), to determine the extent of executive privilege, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974), to decide if a federal law has preempted a state law, Hillsborough County v. Auto-
mated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985), and to determine the scope of execu-
tive power, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (the Steel Seizure
[1251
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structural constitutional cases. For example, the Court has never stated
why it strictly construed both the Presentment Clause,' which requires
Congress to present all legislation to the President so he or she can de-
cide whether or not to use the veto,4 and the Bicameralism Clause, which
mandates that all legislation must be passed by both the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate to prohibit legislative vetoes,5 but subsequently
allowed an administrative agency to decide Article III cases in Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor6 on a balancing theory because
"this inquiry in turn, is guided by the principle that practical attentions
to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should
inform application of Article III." The short answer is that the Court
fluctuates because different clauses and different situations warrant differ-
ent interpretive techniques.8 That answer, however, leaves unresolved
the question of how to interpret each clause.
Three recent separation-of-powers cases, Young v. United States ex
Case). I assume that Justice Jackson's concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case, which sets up a
three-stage balancing test that shifts the presumptions against presidential power, best ex-
presses the current Supreme Court's perspective on foreign affairs. The balance is struck
strongly in favor of the executive, particularly when the armed forces are involved. See Dames
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (executive agreement concerning Iranian hostages and
distribution of Iranian assets); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936) (presidential arms embargo). In other words, not all balancing tests are equally indeter-
minate; sometimes the scales are tilted heavily toward one side.
Justice White has been the most consistent advocate of balancing: "But the history of
separation of powers doctrine is also a history of accommodation and practicality. Apprehen-
sions of an overly powerful branch have not led to undue prophylactic measures that handicap
the effective working of the National Government as a whole." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 999
(White, J., dissenting).
3. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946-48.
4. "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he ap-
proves he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it .... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
5. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919; Chief Justice Burger exalted text and history over expediency:
"In purely practical terms, it is obviously easier for action to be taken by one House without
submission to the President; but it is crystal clear.., that the Framers ranked other values
higher than efficiency." Id at 958-59.
6. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
7. Id. at 847-48. Of course, Chief Justice Marshall was hardly deferential to Congress
when he interpreted Article III in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
8. The Court has frequently tolerated dramatic redistributions in governmental power:
most notably, in accepting the growth of the party system and the administrative state. Ad-
ministrative agencies adjudicate claims, propose and draft regulations that have the force of
law, and execute the laws. They can enter the original jurisdiction of Article III courts, pro-
mulgate regulations that dramatically alter private rights and responsibilities, and exercise
enormous prosecutorial discretion. In such cases, the Court usually has been deferential. See
e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 654 (1988); Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821 (1985).
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reL Vuitton et Fils,9 Morrison v. Olson,1° and Mistretta v. United States, I
demonstrate this tension between rules and standards. Three solitary
opinions by Justice Scalia are lonely calls for increased formalism. Jus-
tice Scalia filed a sole concurrence in Young. He agreed with the
Supreme Court's holdings that a federal trial judge could neither appoint
an interested party as special counsel to prosecute another party for al-
leged criminal contempt of an injunction, 2 nor assign any lawyer to
prosecute such a case without first requesting assistance from the United
States Attorney General's office. 3 Scalia disagreed with the Court's con-
clusion that the federal judge had the power to appoint a special prosecu-
tor after the executive refused to provide assistance. Scalia's dissent in
Morrison virulently attacked the majority's validation of a cbngressional
statute creating special prosecutors who can investigate and prosecute
high ranking executive officials for suspected criminal behavior. In his
Mistretta dissent, Scalia concluded that Congress could not create a Sen-
tencing Commission, partially consisting of article III judges, that would
set limits on trial judges' discretion in sentencing criminals.14
Scalia's criticisms of the majority's flexible conception of separated
powers extended far beyond his concerns that the three decisions would
have adverse effects. In an era wary of formal doctrine and formal cate-
gories, he developed a far-reaching, "formalistic" jurisprudence of sepa-
ration of powers. 5 Scalia defined certain powers as "judicial,"
"executive," or "legislative," ignoring the Morrison majority's warning
about "the difficulty of defining such categories of 'executive' or 'quasi-
legislative' officials .... " 16 Scalia began his concurrence in Young with a
deceptively simple definition: "The judicial power is the power to decide,
in accordance with the law, who should prevail in a case or contro-
versy.""7 According to Scalia, Morrison stripped the executive of one of
its basic powers: to investigate and prosecute crimes.18 Scalia concluded
that the majority wrongly decided Mistretta because it permitted Con-
gress to delegate its "power to make law" to a commission that had no
9. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
10. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
11. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
12. Young, 481 U.S. at 815 (Scalia, J. concurring).
13. Id. at 800-02.
14. Scalia's formalism extends beyond separation-of-power issues to such problems as the
meaning of the First Amendment. See Kannar, Comment: The Constitutional Catechism of
Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1324-38 (1990).
15. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 426 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
16. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 (1988).
17. Young, 481 U.S. at 816 (Scalia, J., concurring).
18. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Fall 19901 ALTERED STATES
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other responsibilities."
Having partially defined the three basic governmental functions,
Justice Scalia sought to isolate or compartmentalize those functions as
much as possible: "It is not for us to determine... how much of the
purely executive powers of government must be within the full control of
the President. The Constitution prescribes that they all are."20 He as-
sailed the Court's "balancing" tests: "[Mistretta] follows the regrettable
tendency of our recent separation-of-powers jurisprudence to treat the
Constitution as though it were no more than a generalized prescription
that the functions of the Branches should not be commingled too
much-how much is too much to be determined, case-by-case, by this
Court. ' 2 1
This Article initially will compare the United States Constitution
and the British constitution2 2 both to evaluate Young, Morrison, and Mis-
tretta, and to develop a sounder approach to all structural issues. Com-
parative constitutional law provides some of the "experience" needed to
decide abstract structural cases.23 Predicting the reverberations of a pro-
posed change within a system will be easier if one has studied how simi-
lar alterations have affected similar organizations. The British
constitution is particularly germane because it was a model for the
American Constitution. The two countries have a shared legal tradi-
tion24 and frequently generate similar positive law. The British constitu-
tion presents, however, a radically different commitment to separation-
19. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 417, 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 709 (emphasis in original) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 426 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22. Although Justice Scalia has expressed doubts about the relevance of foreign law to
constitutional adjudication, comparative constitutional law has a venerable history. Madison
and Hamilton frequently analyzed other countries' forms of government in The Federalist Pa-
pers to support their defense of the proposed Constitution. Comparative law is particularly
pertinent in separation-of-powers cases, helping us determine which characteristics of govern-
ment structure are important and why they are important. One excellent way to gain the
"experience" in law that Justice Holmes exalted over "logic," O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAW 1 (M. Howe ed. 1963), is to study how other countries have balanced freedom and
authority.
23. Separation-of-powers issues are harder to compare than individual rights cases. For
example, if one wants to use comparative law to help determine whether executing juveniles is
unconstitutional, one need only examine several British statutes. Structural powers are more
subtly interrelated.
24. Professor Damaska contrasted the Anglo-American legal systems with the continental
systems. The Anglo-American systems were more interested in dispute resolution, while the
continental systems were more policy oriented. These underlying differences reflect the Conti-
nent's greater willingness to use the state as manager in contrast to the Anglo-American con-
ception of an umpire. M. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 8-15
(1986).
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of-powers. My analysis of and reaction to the British constitution helped
formulate the following interrelated propositions: (1) the Supreme Court
should never be distracted by various interpretive strategies from fulfil-
ling its primary constitutional obligation to combat tyranny; (2) the
Supreme Court should be wary of undermining the strong American
constitutional tradition of separated powers carefully developed by James
Madison to prevent tyranny; (3) because the powers to hire and fire
largely determine constitutional structures, the Supreme Court should be
extremely reluctant to allow members of any branch to have any ex-
traconstitutional means of hiring or firing "principal officials" within the
other two branches, particularly when those means involve the criminal
law;2" (4) the Court should change its doctrine if one branch gains
supremacy over another branch or terrorizes individual citizens. Analy-
sis of the British constitution supports the thesis that the United States
Supreme Court should be more formalistic in appointments and remov-
als cases, particularly in cases in which one branch of government
removes officers of another through criminal proceedings.
These four propositions support a quasi-formalistic doctrine that
reaches the same results as Justice Scalia's three opinions in Young,26
Morrison,27 and Mistretta,28 but is less threatening to existing administra-
tive agencies, which usually combine executive, legislative, and judicial
functions. Instead of trying to isolate all governmental powers depend-
ing upon their classification as "legislative," "executive," or "judicial," as
Scalia has proposed, the Court should create a strong presumption
against giving principals in one branch any additional powers, particu-
larly criminal law powers to hire, fire, reward, or punish principals in
another branch. This presumption could be rebutted if the branch seek-
ing the additional power could prove "necessity." If personnel having
important governmental responsibilities are significantly segregated, one
branch is not likely to dominate another, even if substantive powers, such
as control over foreign affairs and the budget, remain shared or if other
powers are combined at the agency level.29
25. There is a due process component to this presumption that this Article will not dis-
cuss. Meticulous due process is crucial in criminal cases, particularly those cases with political
overtones.
26. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
27. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
28. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
29. This proposal emphasizes separating powers by personnel as much, if not more, than
by separating functions. Professor Munro concluded that Montesquieu "advocates, at the
minimum, that one agency of government should not be performing the function appropriate
to another. But whether [Montesquieu] would insist on a complete separation of personnel in
Fall 19901
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The proposed presumption would not radically disturb existing ad-
ministrative agencies because most of their powers are based upon civil
law.3 Furthermore, the existing administrative agencies already signifi-
cantly segregate personnel. Administrative adjudication is normally per-
formed by administrative law judges, who are largely isolated from
principal officers.31 Independent regulatory agencies are partially insu-
lated from all three branches; their combined powers have not been con-
centrated in any one branch. In addition, civil administrative agencies
remain somewhat accountable to all three branches. The President ap-
points the officials and oversees many operations, Congress can pass leg-
islation to overrule administrative regulations, and the courts normally
can review agency decisions.
Justice Scalia's formalistic approach is potentially more disruptive.
For example, he argued in Morrison that all executive power remains
with the President.32 This contention threatens the independence of the
Federal Reserve Board. His conclusion in Mistretta that Congress can-
not delegate its power to make law33 threatens the constitutionality of all
administrative rule making.
This Article's suggested presumption would change the results of
Young,34 Morrison,35 and Mistretta,36 all of which affect the rights of
criminal defendants. Accordingly, the Court should have held in Morri-
son that Congress could not create special criminal prosecutors because
Congress obtained an unnecessary, extraconstitutional tool to eliminate
and intimidate principal executive officials, and because criminal prose-
cutors are principal officers that only the President can appoint. In
Young, the Court should have concluded that courts do not have the
the different agencies is less obvious." C. MUNRO, STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 191
(1987).
30. This Article does not resolve how much the presumption should affect civil adminis-
trative agencies, partially because there are so many complex variations. It is possible, for
instance, that the presumption should be applied against executive review of civil adjudications
that are not subject to judicial review. Nor will this Article try to predict how the presumption
might apply to other civil law questions or to novel alterations in civil administrative law. At
the least, this Article suggests that the Court should not be completely deferential. Finally,
doctrinal formalists should be wary of proposing doctrine that extends far beyond the facts in
any particular case or cases. One does not want the doctrine to become either too inflexible or
too mechanical. Indeed, one reason for preferring Justice Powell's concurrence in INS v.
Chadha over the majority opinion is its narrower scope. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983).
31. Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980).
32. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
33. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
34. Young v. United States ex reL Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
35. Morrison, 487 U.S. 654.
36. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361.
[Vol. 18:125
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power to hire and fire criminal prosecutors to prosecute criminal con-
tempts outside the courtroom because criminal prosecutors are principal
executive officers exercising a core executive function. The Court should
have decided in Mistretta that Congress cannot put article III judges on a
substantive criminal law commission, particularly when they can be fired
by the President."
Part I presents an overview of the British constitutional structure,
focusing on who can appoint or elect whom. The description will not
"prove" that Morrison, Young, and Mistretta were wrongly decided, nor
will it automatically generate the proposed presumption, which is fairly
narrow. In fact, the comparison will in some respects make the inquiry
into constitutional structure more indeterminate; the British constitution
demonstrates that tyranny will not necessarily arise within a system that
contains far less separation of powers than the American structure.38
Any lawyer knows that a presentation of positive law generates nor-
mative reactions. It is my hope that the reader's reactions will be similar
to mine: before studying the British constitution, I thought that such
cases as INS v. Chadha,39 which prohibited the legislative veto, and Bow-
sher v. Synar,4° which prevented Congress from appointing the Comp-
troller General to oversee the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction system,
were unrealistically technical and rigid. Analysis of the British constitu-
tion convinced me that too much fluidity is inappropriate for the Ameri-
can legal and political culture. The American Constitution's separation
37. Many additional controversial categories need to be utilized to make even this rela-
tively narrow presumption work. The presumption needs underlying definitions of the three
forms of power, "legislative," "executive," and "judicial." Additionally, the Court must de-
fine, somewhat arbitrarily, such fluid terms as "substantive," . criminal," "principal," and
"core function."
38. Former Judge Robert Bork summarizes the American perspective:
The foundation of American freedoms is in the structure of our Republic. The major
features of that structure are the separation of the powers of the national government
and the limitation of national power to preserve a large degree of autonomy with the
states. Both are mandated by the Constitution. These dispersions of power, viewed
historically, have guaranteed our liberties as much as, perhaps more than, the Bill of
Rights itself.
R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 4 (1990)
Some British lawyers are becoming increasingly worried that their country is becoming
less free. See K. EWING & C. GEARTY, FREEDOM UNDER THATCHER (1990). Ewing and
Gearty locate the threat to civil liberties in England's constitutional structure:
The major source of the problem in our view is a political system that has allowed the
concentration of power in the hands of the executive (and the Prime Minister in
particular) and the absence of any effective checks and balances.
Id. at 255. The authors, however, do not recommend a Bill of Rights. Id at 262-74.
39. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
40. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
Fall 19901 ALTERED STATES
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of powers should not be balanced into a facsimile of the British constitu-
tion's far more casual conception of separation of powers. Nor should
the United States quickly discard its tradition of separated powers, be-
cause Britain's system has become dangerously over-centralized, placing
an excessive amount of power in the hands of one person, the Prime
Minister.41 Although many readers may disagree about the conclusions
deduced from the following description of the British constitution, most
readers nonetheless will learn more about the perpetually changing Brit-
ish constitution. This satisfies a subsidiary purpose of the Article, which
sometimes extends beyond patronage issues to provide an overall view of
the British constitution.
The rather lengthy description of the British constitution also serves
as a metaphor for the two years I lived in England and taught English
constitutional law. Personal experience can and should change constitu-
tional jurisprudence. Thus, the structure of this Article reflects tradi-
tional British views to which I was exposed during those two years.
Part II compares the American and British systems, exploring some
*of the relationships between culture, politics, structural law, and positive
law.42 In Part III, this Article will apply the understanding gained by
that comparison to Young,4 3 Morrison,4  and Mistretta.45
Part IV will take an abrupt turn, asserting that a deeper lesson of
the British constitution is that the United States Supreme Court should
not be overly wedded to stare decisis in structural cases. The Court
should take a contextual approach both when initially formulating doc-
trine and when reconsidering decisions over time.
In Part V, this Article thus proposes a separation-of-powers meth-
odology that oscillates between "balancing" and more "formalistic"
41. Margaret Thatcher's confrontational style of politics and her dominance of the Cabi-
net increased many observers' concerns about the British constitution. H. YOUNG, ONE OF
Us 538-46 (1989). The resignation of Prime Minister Thatcher, which occurred late in the
creation of this Article, demonstrates that the Prime Minister's powers are finite. Whitney,
Thatcher Says She'll Quit, Bowing to Tory Challenge After 11 1/2 Years as Leader, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 23, 1990, at A8.
42. The crucial relationship between law and culture remains elusive, as seen in Professor
Finer's conclusion to his wide-ranging survey of political systems: "Social structure generates
the substantive issues of politics and colours the style in which these are disputed. It does not
seem to me to impose any of the main forms of government I have catalogued and described."
S. FINER, COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT 589 (1970) (emphasis in original). For a thoughtful
comparison of the British and American cultures, see R. CHESSHRYE, THE RETURN OF A
NATIVE REPORTER (1987).
43. Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
44. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
45. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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techniques.46 The Justices should initially weigh all available arguments
and data, including comparative law. That threshold balancing inquiry
can appropriately lead the Court either to adopt a formal, textual solu-
tion or to apply a balancing test. Neither solution is per se invalid. Any
formal doctrine or superficial balancing test may be undermined, how-
ever, by the balancing test proposed in Part V: a perpetual skepticism
toward stare decisis. The Court should not become so bound by its pre-
vious decisions that it loses sight of its primary responsibility of main-
taining an effective balance of power within the government47 while
simultaneously preventing tyranny. Admittedly, this Article's two doc-
trinal recommendations-increased formalism in appointments decisions
and decreased deference to precedent-operate at cross-purposes. Such
tensions reflect the fact that the two concepts are only tools in the battle
against tyranny, not ultimate ends.
I. The British Constitution
The British constitution can bewilder American constitutional lawyers.
The two well-known characteristics of the British constitution-that it is
unwritten and that Parliament (consisting of the House of Commons, the
House of Lords, and the Queen) is supreme-obfuscate as well as ex-
plain. First, the British constitution is largely textual. It is found in stat-
utes, legal opinions, and scholarly works.48 Moreover, "unwritten"
constitutional conventions, such as the Prime Minister's duty to resign or
to hold a general election if he or she cannot command a Parliamentary
majority, are continually written about.49
Second, Parliament is "supreme" and "sovereign," in that its law
cannot be overturned by the courts, but it cannot bind future Parlia-
ments.5 0 Parliament also remains accountable to the voters, who thus
retain political sovereignty. Finally, the doctrine of parliamentary sov-
46. See Wilson, The Morality of Formalism, 33 UCLA L. REv. 431 (1985). Utilizing
"formal" doctrinal solutions implies neither acceptance nor rejection of the broader claims
that some "legal formalists" make. "In relating law to the most abstract forms of interaction,
formalism presents an uncompromising version of law's internal coherence and of the conse-
quent possibility of distinguishing the juridical from the political." Weinrib, LegalFormalism:
On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 1013 (1988). This author is wary of
the quests for uncompromising coherence and clear separation of law from politics.
47. This Article is neither devising a grand balancing test that will decide how all struc-
tural cases should be resolved, nor creating a subsequent, detailed balancing test that will
determine which cases should be overruled if and when there is a dangerous shift in power.
48. See, ag., A. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CON-
STITUTION (10th ed. 1960).
49. See, eg., R. BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 173-77(1988).
50. See C. MUNRO, supra note 29, at 86-87; see generally id. at 79-108.
Fall 19901
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ereignty has common law origins.5 ' In an extreme situation, courageous
judges could possibly alter that doctrine.52
The British constitution also forces an American constitutional law-
yer to reevaluate basic premises, ask disturbing questions, and struggle
with seemingly paradoxical issues. For instance, is the American con-
cern over separation of powers excessive since two radically different
structures frequently generate similar laws? Or is it possible that
America's more theoretical, principled approach to law and rights poses
a greater long-term threat to civil liberties than Britain's flexible ap-
proach? Why do the British have a wider and livelier range of public
debate even though they have no textually protected constitutional right
to free speech?
Analysis of the British constitution reveals the narrowness of much
American constitutional law thinking. Because the British constitution
is "unwritten," the British perceive that their "constitution" extends far
beyond cases, encompassing all distributions of governmental power.
British constitutional law students study internal party structures, inter-
nal parliamentary procedures, and the structure of the executive, unlike
their American counterparts who study a few sections of the United
States Constitution and some of the myriad cases interpreting those
sections.
Three concepts make the British constitution more comprehensible.
First, H.L.A. Hart's "rule of recognition" explains how a largely "un-
written" constitutional structure generates binding laws.53 A second is
to determine the process by which a tyrant might legally seize control of
the British government. That inquiry helps reveal the extent of checks
and balances and separation of powers. The third tool, our primary de-
vice, is to determine who can hire and fire whom.5
51. Id at 103.
52. The judicial rule of parliamentary sovereignty is unique: "it lies in the keeping of the
Courts, and no act of Parliament can take it from them." H. WADE, THE BASIS OF LEGAL
SOVEREIGNTY 187 (1955). If the courts keep the rule, perhaps they alone can change it.
53. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). For example, in Stockdale v. Hansard
the Law Lords held that a House of Commons resolution was not law because it had not been
passed by all three parts of "Queen in Parliament": the House of Commons, the House of
Lords, and the Queen. The judges would recognize, as law, only those bills that the Speaker of
the House had certified as passed by the Queen in Parliament. Stockdale v. Hansard, 112 Eng.
Rep. 1112 (Q.B. 1839).
A.V. Dicey made a similar argument in 1885. "The important thing is to make clear that
the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty is both on its positive side and on its negative side,
fully recognized by the law of England." A. DICEY, supra note 48, at 41.
54. Professor Marshall made a similar observation about the American system: "Though
the physical separation of the American President and his Cabinet from Congress is the feature
which superficially attracts attention, it is clearly less significant than the fact that the execu-
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A. The Electoral Structure
Just over a century ago, English law professor A.V. Dicey, who al-
most single-handedly organized the British constitution into a coherent,
accessible whole, distinguished "legal sovereignty" from "political sover-
eignty" to explain the nature of parliamentary sovereignty. Only Parlia-
ment had the legal powers, or legal sovereignty, to pass laws, including
laws by which Parliament could reconstitute itself. The people, however,
retained political sovereignty. Because they elect the members of the
House of Commons and retain the right to disobey or resist Parliament's
laws,55 "their will is under the present constitution sure to obtain ulti-
mate obedience." 6 Consequently, this Article's description of the British
constitution shall begin with a review of the role elections play in the
selection and replacement of political leadership. Representative govern-
ment must include the people's ability to change its leadership through
elections.
By far the most important election is that of the House of Com-
mons, which dominates the Crown, the House of Lords, and the judici-
ary. This domination by the only elected branch over the rival branches
insures a significant degree of accountability and legitimacy. 57 For exam-
ple, if the Crown exercised its prerogative to veto a bill, a measure it has
not taken since 1707,58 the electorate would probably consider the refusal
to grant the royal assent a virtually revolutionary breach of constitu-
tional convention. 59 The government would probably make dissolution
of the Crown the central issue in the next general election.'
The House of Lords, which is also unelected, retained coordinate
tive branch can neither be removed by, nor dissolve, the legislature." G. MARSHALL, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL THEORY 99 (1971).
55. Id. at 76-77.
56. A. DICEY, supra note 48, at 76.
57. Some British scholars have argued that the British constitution is not as "legitimate"
as its defenders maintain. See McAuslan & McEldowney, Legitimacy and the Constitution:
The Dissonance Between Theory and Practice, in LAW, LEGITIMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION
1-38 (1985).
58. Queen Anne did not give her royal assent to a Militia Bill passed by Parliament. G.
MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 22 (1986).
59. "Conventions" are constitutional norms or rules that the courts cannot enforce. See
R. BRAZIER, supra note 49.
60. By refusing to grant her assent to a particularly tyrannical statute, the Queen could at
least force another election or an armed confrontation between the government and the mili-
tary, which has made an oath to obey the Crown. Thus the royal assent remains a possible
check on extremely evil behavior. Such a denial is unlikely, however. The Queen's review is
usually perfunctory. The Queen sees only the short title of the bill, not the full text, when she
signifies her assent. Bennion, Modern Royal Assent Procedure at Westminster, 1981 ST. L.
REV. 139.
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legislative power over all issues aside from money matters until 1911.61
The Lords were forced to pass the Parliament Bill of 1911, which
stripped them of most of their power. Angered at a prior rejection of a
money bill in 1909 and vindicated by an election on that issue in 1910,
the Liberals threatened to pack the Lords with new Liberal peers if they
failed to pass the 1911 Bill.62 Under the Bill (as amended in 1949), the
Speaker of the House can present any money bill for royal assent one
month after placing it before the Lords. Almost all other bills can be
presented to the Crown after one year. One crucial exception to the
Lord's plenary legislative power remains: the Lords must concur when-
ever the House of Commons seeks to extend a Parliamentary session be-
yond five years. The system therefore guarantees elections every five
years unless all three branches agree. Led by the Prime Minister, the
Commons would need the Crown's assent to pack the Lords if they re-
sisted such an extension.
This brief description of the British government's electoral structure
dramatically demonstrates the crucial significance of appointments. The
House of Lords became subservient to the House of Commons because
the Prime Minister could appoint any number of new Lords.63 On the
other hand, the House of Commons legally can do anything else without
serious resistance by the House of Lords, the Crown, or the Courts,
which must defer to any bill that the Speaker of the House has certified
as having progressed through the Queen in Parliament. 6
The electorate's political will is the major constraint on the House of
Commons and the government it creates. That will, of course, is ex-
pressed unevenly. As is usually the case, powerful interest groups fare
best.65
61. The balance of power shifted to the House of Commons via the Parliament Act of
1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 13).
62. W. JENNINGS, THE BRITSH CONSTruTION 104 (1971).
63. The statutory requirement that elections must be held every five years (a requirement
that could be set aside by another statute) forces an aspiring dictator to make public his or her
anti-democratic intentions.
64. "The plain truth is that our tribunals uniformly act on the principle that a law alleged
to be a bad law is ex hypothesis a law, and therefore entitled to obedience by the courts." A.
DICEY, supra note 48, at 63. The House of Lords reaffirmed the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty in Pickin v. British Railways Board, 1974 A.C. 765.
65. For example, brewers were able to limit the government's attempts to eliminate their
control of the pubs, but barristers have struggled in their attempts to prevent solicitors from
being able to try more cases. The Economist explained that the brewers prevailed because they
faced no organized opposition, but the Bar appears to be losing because the legal profession is
internally divided between solicitors and barristers. Bagehot, Mackay's Triumph, THE ECON-
OMIST, July 22, 1989, at 54.
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The vote, the formal tool through which the people's will largely is
expressed, remains legally vulnerable because it receives no special con-
stitutional protection. Elections, for example, were delayed during
World Wars I and II116 Parliament could pass a bill eliminating elections
without holding another election to "legitimate" such an authoritarian
decision. The vote can also be "diluted."6 7 Parliament has established
a Boundary Commission6" that proposes electoral districts containing
significantly different numbers of voters. One constituency in London,
for example, had 84,401 voters, while its neighbor had 56,121.69 In re-
sponse to a lawsuit brought by the Labour Party challenging such uneven
districting, the House of Lords held that the Commission is not obligated
to make numerical equality its first priority.7 0 The Commission can give
more weight to geographical or historical boundaries. British citizens
have the right to vote, but the size of the voting district gives individual
votes varying degrees of strength. 71
The electorate can also express itself by electing local authorities.7 2
Historically, the local authorities, funded primarily by property taxes,
have provided such governmental services as education, welfare, public
housing, roads, planning, and public transportation. 73 The Thatcher ad-
ministration engaged in a protracted conflict with many local authorities
run by left-wing Labour leaders.74 Former Prime Minister Thatcher at-
tempted to reduce the power of local authorities by centralizing the edu-
66. W. JENNINGS, supra note 62, at 12.
67. Britain's radically uneven distribution of parliamentary seats was once the central
focus of political and constitutional controversy. The English distorted boroughs in Ireland in
the early 1600s to allow Protestants to control the local Parliament. R. FOSTER, MODERN
IRELAND 1600-1972 (1988).
68. The Commission consists of the Speaker of the House of Commons, a High Court
judge, and two majority party members (these last two selections are made with the agreement
of the other political parties). C. TURPIN, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTrrUTIoN:
TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 408-09 (1985). The Commission's report is submitted to the
Home Secretary, who then must offer it to Parliament for final approval. Id at 414-15.
69. Id. at 414.
70. Regina v. Boundary Commission, 1983 Q.B. 600 (C.A.).
71. The United States Supreme Court, however, has constitutionalized the "one per-
son/one vote" standard for most state and federal elections. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
72. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, the famous Socialist historians, described the evolution of
local governments in S. WEBB & B. WEBB, ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1963).
73. C. TURPIN, supra note 68, at 208-09.
74. See Grant, Central-Local Relations: The Balance of Power, in THE CHANGING CON-
STITUTION 229-49 (1985).
This struggle has frequently reached the courts. One of the best examples is Regina v.
Secretary of the State for the Environment, 1986 A.C. 240. The Lords rejected claims by local
authorities that the Secretary of State had either misinterpreted the relevant statute or acted
unreasonably when he set standards for expenditures by local authorities. The statute, inciden-
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cation curriculum, allowing parents to opt out of specific public schools,
selling public housing to those who live in the units, and substituting a
poll tax based on family size for a rate tax based on property values.75
B. Parliamentary Structure
The concentration of the United Kingdom's governmental powers
extends far beyond the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Parlia-
ment is controlled by the majority party in the House of Commons,
which in turn is dominated by the Prime Minister. 6 By convention, the
Crown must appoint as Prime Minister the person best able to form and
maintain a majority in the House of Commons." The Prime Minister
then chooses Cabinet members and inferior governmental officials from
his or her own party within the House of Commons and, to a lesser de-
gree, within the House of Lords. The members of government retain
their seats in Parliament and must publicly maintain complete loyalty to
the government's policies under the convention of "collective responsibil-
ity." Governmental decisions, however, may be contested in private.7"
Government officials' power to retain their seats in Parliament while per-
forming their Cabinet duties is the most dramatic example of the lack of
separation of powers in Britain in comparison to the United States. The
United States Constitution explicitly prohibits such a structure. 9
The government's dominance is enhanced by the convention that
requires the rest of the majority party Ministers of Parliament (MPs),
called "backbenchers," to comply with their leaders' wishes on specific
votes. Except in rare cases,8 0 the MPs do not have discretion to vote in
tally, had the equivalent of a legislative veto; the Secretary was required to submit any varia-
tions from uniformity to the House of Commons for approval.
75. H. YOUNG, supra note 41, at 538.
76. "Patronage in relation to Ministers is the most political power enjoyed by a Prime
Minister, for it establishes his supreme place in the eyes of his government and parliamentary
party." R. BRAZIER, supra note 49, at 66.
77. In theory, the majority party could purge the opposition. The House of Commons
maintains complete control over its membership.
78. That convention is frequently breached by Ministers who "leak" information to the
press. The Labour Party also suspended the convention to allow its Ministers to express their
personal views to the English voters before they voted on a referendum over whether or not to
join the Common Market. C. TURPIN, supra note 68, at 147. Conventions vary dramatically
in their importance and in their capacity to constrain politicians.
79. "No Person holding Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House
during his Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
80. Sometimes the government allows its MPs to vote their own consciences, such as on
the decision to abolish capital punishment. In addition to such "free votes," backbenchers can
revolt and vote against the government. For instance, Thatcher's government in 1986 could
not gather enough support to pass the Shops Bill, which would have allowed more stores to
stay open on Sunday. H. YOUNG, supra note 41, at 482.
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the way they think best represents their constituency and their nation.
The backbenchers, however, retain power to criticize their leaders,"1 re-
place the Prime Minister in annual elections, 2 and force a new election
by joining the opposition for a vote of no confidence. Upon a vote of no
confidence, the backbenchers can force the Prime Minister to resign or
dissolve Parliament. 3 Consequently, one must study both Parliament's
internal structure and that of the major political parties to comprehend
the British constitution.
Packed 4 into a small replica of the original House of Commons
built after the original was bombed in World War II, Members of Parlia-
ment jeer and snarl at each other under a system politely named "adver-
sary politics." The British parliamentary culture has the classic vices
and virtues of any well-organized adversarial system: clear winners and
losers, probing debate, competitive pressure, a propensity for generating
alternative perspectives, polarization, excessive rhetoric, and a limited
ability to reach compromise and accommodation.
Within this system, the opposition parties only have the right to crit-
icize and ask questions of the government. By convention, they have
several "supply days" that they can use to cross-examine the govern-
ment. They have numerous other opportunities to ask questions and de-
bate the government, with the most heated exchanges usually occurring
between Ministers and their "shadows" who are part of the opposition.
The opposition, however, is at a serious disadvantage in performing these
functions. Parliamentarians have very few resources, 5 while the govern-
ment has the assistance of permanent civil servants who by convention
impartially serve whichever party is in power.8 6 Backbenchers from
81. For a sardonic description of life as a Conservative backbencher during the Thatcher
era, see J. CRITCHLEY, WESTMINSTER BLUES (1985).
82. See supra note 41.
83. R. BRAZIER, supra note 49, at 173-77.
84. There are only 427 seats for 650 members of Parliament. P. SILK, How PARLIAMENT
WORKS 5-6 (2d ed. 1989).
85. The following table demonstrates the average MP's woeful lack of resources, particu-
larly in contrast to the gigantic American congressional staffs:
Number of MPs employing
none one two more than two
Rsch Ass. 310 235 65 40
Secretaries 185 337 41 37
Id. at 35.
86. W. JENNINGS, supra note 62, at 147. This convention, like so many others, has taken
a beating in the last decade. Civil servants frequently are called to testify before select commit-
tees. Many Labour politicians have accused the civil service of having an underlying conserva-
tive bias. Civil service loyalty to the party in power can include supplying parliamentary
Fall 19901
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both parties have complained about their inability to fulfill their constitu-
tional obligation to criticize and confront the government.
Effecting a major change, the Thatcher government passed a bill au-
thorizing dramatic expansion of "Select Committees" in 1980. Select
Committees provide permanent oversight of selected governmental func-
tions. As of November 1, 1988, thirteen committees of backbenchers are
in operation," reviewing overseeing departments ranging from Agricul-
ture to Welsh Affairs.18 The committees generally are nonpartisan and
their membership is relatively permanent (at least in comparison to
Standing Committees, which are temporary committees set up to evalu-
ate specific legislation). The Select Committees can require regular citi-
zens to attend meetings, but not other MPs or members of the House of
Lords. They also cannot force departments to produce internal docu-
ments or compel civil servants to testify.8 9 Because the government con-
trols the House of Commons and its contempt powers, which enables the
committees to compel testimony, it can refuse to answer questions when-
ever it wishes.90
1. The Legislative Process
The majority party, through the government, completely controls
the legislative process. Almost all important bills 91 are proposed by the
Prime Minister in the Queen's Speech, which inaugurates every session of
Parliament. These bills are created by a combination of government offi-
questions to disrupt Opposition inquiry. G. MARSHALL, supra note 58, at 76. The Labour
Party politician Denis Healey disagreed with claims that civil servants are politically biased:
"Throughout my career in politics I found civil servants, if anything, overscrupulous to avoid
party prejudice." D. HEALEY, THE TIME OF My LIFE 107 (1989).
87. The Scottish committee was not functioning because there was an insufficient number
of interested Conservatives to fill the committee due to the lack of Conservative MPs elected in
Scotland. P. SILK, supra note 84, at 220.
88. Id. at 220-21.
89. Id. at 223.
90. The government may face political pressure if it does not cooperate. For instance, the
Thatcher government had to release more information than it wished to a committee investiga-
tion of the Westland affair. Id.
91. Some important acts begin as "private members bills." At every session the govern-
ment permits ten of its backbenchers to introduce their own legislation. During one brief
period, 1964 to 1970, the Labour government supported several important private members
bills, such as the Abortion Act of 1967, and the Sexual Offenses Act of 1967, which
decriminalized homosexual behavior between consenting adults. Normally, private members
bills are narrow in scope. M. ZANDER, THE LAW MAKING PROcEss 67 (1989).
On rare occasions, important legislation is implemented through the "private bill" pro-
cess. Such legislation covers such topics as nationalized industries, local authorities, universi-
ties, and commercial ventures. Id. at 68. By far the most significant recent example has been
the "private bill" to authorize private parties to buy land to build the tunnel under the English
Channel.
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cials, permanent civil servants, interest groups, and a small group of law-
yers skilled in statutory drafting.92 Most major bills are presented for
three "readings" before the House of Commons, although a few begin in
the House of Lords. A proposed bill is presented for a first reading in a
summary proceeding. The bill is then debated during a second reading,
but no amendments are allowed at that time.93 After the second reading,
the proposed bill is referred to a Standing Committee controlled by the
ruling majority party. These temporary committees, consisting of be-
tween sixteen and fifty members, can make amendments. Successful
amendments almost always are technical in nature and almost always
government sponsored. 94 The bills are returned to the full House for the
third reading. After that formality, bills are sent to the House of Lords.
The Lords both substantively criticize and technically edit bills, thereby
providing another forum for debate and reconsideration.
Occasionally a bill dies in the House of Lords. For example, the
House of Lords blocked an effort by the Labour Party to weaken the
power of the Boundary Commission. 95 Such rare defeats should never
obscure the overwhelming power of the government. For example, for-
mer Prime Minister Thatcher's plan to change the tax base for local au-
thorities from property values to a poll tax ran into severe resistance
from within and without her own party.96  The proposal nevertheless
has become law. 97
2. The MPs and the Prime Minister
Rebellious majority party members face a variety of sanctions from
the Prime Minister. Aside from the classic forms of power-making pol-
icy, allocating resources, 98 declaring war, having virtually unlimited ac-
92. S. DE SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 286-87 (1985).
93. Id. at 288-89.
94. The statistics tell the story. Professor Griffith studied three parliamentary sessions;
during that time period the Ministers successfully introduced 906 out of 907 amendments,
while the opposition only implemented 29 out of 599 proposals and government backbenchers
saw Committees adopt only 10 of their 89 proposals. J. GRIFFITH, PARLIAMENTARY SCRU-
TINY OF GOVERNMENT BILLS 159 (1974), cited in M. ZANDER, supra note 91, at 71. For a
recent series of essays discussing Parliament, see M. RYLE & P. RICHARDS, THE COMMONS
UNDER SCRUTINY (3d ed. 1988).
95. C. TURPIN, supra note 68, at 426.
96. H. YOUNG, supra note 41, at 522. The tax has not garnered much popular support.
Id. at 529.
97. Id. at 522.
98. Elliott, The Control of Public Expenditure, in J. JOWELL & D. OLIVER, THE CHANG-
ING CONSTITUTION 149-73 (1985).
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cess to the media,99 and controlling information-the Prime Minister has
enormous powers of patronage: she or he appoints the Cabinet, the com-
mittees within the Cabinet, any ad hoc groups within the Cabinet to con-
duct specific policies (such as overseeing the Falklands War), members of
the House of the Lords, the Lord Chancellor (who is the equivalent of
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court but who remains a member of
Cabinet dismissible at will), members of the judiciary (through the Lord
Chancellor), top civil servants (who in turn make the careers of lower
civil servants), and the party Whips."c° The Whips assign MPs for the
temporary Standing Committees.101 They also appoint and influence the
backbench MPs who will sit on the Committee of Selection that assigns
MPs to the Select Committees."°2 The Whips advise the Liaison Com-
mittee, which coordinates committee work.103 The Prime Minister ap-
points the Speaker of the House, who by convention must impartially
conduct Parliament's sessions."° The Prime Minister influences or
designates the chairs of all nationalized industries, Royal Commissions,
ambassadors, chiefs of staff, the heads of national security services, as
well as members of a variety of public boards.0 5 The Prime Minister
distributes a variety of honors, such as turning former President Ronald
Reagan into Sir Ronald Reagan.1 0 6 After consulting with the Cabinet,
the Prime Minister has the power to request the Crown to dissolve Par-
liament any time before the statutory five year requirement is met.107
99. See, eg., M. COKERELL, P. HENNESSY & D. WALKER, SOURCES CLOSE TO THE
PRIME MINISTER (1984).
100. Whips are considered part of the government. R. BRAZIER, supra note 49, at 120.
101. S. DE SMITH, supra note 92, at 290.
102. P. SILK, supra note 84, at 227.
103. The Liaison Committee consists of the fourteen select committee chairmen. R. BRA-
ZIER, supra note 49, at 188 n.163. These chairmen were elected by the members of each com-
mittee. Id. at 188. Thus there is some autonomy from Whip pressure.
104. The parliamentary counsel, who draft most legislation, are formally responsible to the
Prime Minister. Professor Zander concluded, however, that "in practice they are effectively
not accountable to anyone." M. ZANDER, supra note 91, at 49-50.
105. R. BRAZIER, supra note 49, at 81-82.
106. The Queen retains a few honors that she alone can distribute.
107. Parliamentary dissolution resembles a mass lay-off, putting all the MPs' jobs at risk.
See G. MARSHALL, supra note 58, at 45-53. It is conceivable, however, that the Crown might
refuse a Prime Minister's request to dissolve Parliament. The Prime Minister may no longer
be able to command a majority, but some other leader or coalition of leaders might be able to
provide a stable government. The Crown might also deny the Prime Minister's request if the
Prime Minister already has made several such dissolutions within a short period of time, and
seems only to be trying to increase the majority party's strength. See R. BRAZIER, supra note
49, at 6-62. Professor Marshall argues that the Prime Minister may actually have to consult
with the Cabinet before seeking a dissolution and that total resistance by the Cabinet might
prevent a dissolution. G. MARSHALL, supra note 58, at 51-53. See THE BRITISH PRIME MIN-
ISTER (A. King ed. 1985) for a series of essays on the Prime Minister.
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Tony Benn, a left-wing leader in the Labour Party and staunch critic of
the existing constitution, particularly criticized the Prime Minister's vast
powers to hire and fire. Benn contended that this power, "without any
constitutional need for approval by Parliament or the Party[,] is the most
decisive for it is by its use, or threat of use, that all the other powers...
fall into the hands of the Prime Minister alone." 10 Benn has argued for
reforms within the party structures, not the formal parliamentary struc-
ture. 0 9 His most important recommendation has been that whenever all
the Labour Party MPs regain power, they should be able to elect all Cab-
inet officials except for the new Prime Minister. 110 Under this scheme,
both the Cabinet and the backbenchers would have more influence be-
cause Cabinet members could not be fired or shuffled at the will of the
Prime Minister. This scheme would help restore the Cabinet's power
which has dwindled over the past decades."11
The Prime Minister does not have complete discretion, however,
over the composition of the Cabinet. Bound by the convention of indi-
vidual responsibility, some Cabinet Ministers are forced to resign. Under
that doctrine, each Cabinet member is responsible to Parliament (and
thus to the people) for any errors committed by his or her department or
for any personal failings.1 12 This convention is notoriously unpredictable
in its application.113 In addition, Ministers can resign voluntarily and
backbenchers can withdraw support.1 1 4  Thus, the Prime Minister's
108. P. NORTON, THE CONSTITUTION IN FLUX, 44 (1982). (This source was unavailable
for verification due to delays in intercontinental shipping. Ed.)
109. Id.
110. Id. at45.
111. Both Labour and Conservative Prime Ministers have made many major decisions,
particularly concerning nuclear weapons policy, without Cabinet participation or even knowl-
edge. With stunning regularity, Margaret Thatcher summarily transferred major Cabinet
leaders to less prestigious positions or fired them. See P. HENNESSY, CABINET 123-62 (1986).
112. See, e.g., G. MARSHALL, supra note 58, at 61-66, 222-24.
113. For example, Lord Carrington stepped down from being Foreign Secretary after Ar-
gentina successfully invaded the Falkland Islands. R. BRAZIER, supra note 49, at 137. On the
other hand, James Prior remained in charge of Northern Ireland after several Irish prisoners
escaped from prison. The convention nevertheless retains some weight. Margaret Thatcher
had to dismiss Cecil Parkinson, one of her closest allies, after it was discovered that his mis-
tress was going to have a baby. H. YOUNG, supra note 41, at 342-44. She also had to sacrifice
another favorite, Leon Brittan, who leaked confidential information during the Westland
Affair.
114. The 1987 resignation of Nigel Lawson, Chancellor of the Exchequer, over Britain's
monetary policy and Britain's relation with Europe, weakened Thatcher enough to trigger a
half-hearted formal challenge to her leadership. Bagehot, Skullduggery and Mayhem, cont,
THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 11, 1989, at 75, col. 1. Bagehot also described how the voting system
might be used to challenge Prime Minister Thatcher inside the Tory Party. Bagehot, Brain
Teaser, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 11, 1989, at 75, col. 3.
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power varies from month to month, year to year.115
Theoretically, the Prime Minister has limited control of
prosecutorial discretion of criminal cases. That control raises issues di-
rectly analogous to those addressed in Morrison v. Olson 16 and Young v.
United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils.'17 The Prime Minister appoints to
the Cabinet the two officials, the Attorney General and the Solicitor Gen-
eral, who by convention should not institute prosecutions for party ad-
vantage. 118 Several major statutes, such as the Official Secrets Act 1 9 and
the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984,120 how-
ever, give these officials exclusive discretion to bring prosecutions. Nev-
ertheless, prosecutorial discretion is not as controlled by the government
in Britain as it is controlled by the executive in the United States. Under
English common law, any citizen can trigger a criminal prosecution by
filing a complaint,1 2' unless a statute explicitly limits that decision to the
government. The Attorney General, however, can quash any private
prosecution by entering a nolle prosequi.122 Courts cannot review the
Attorney General's decisions to commence or to terminate both criminal
proceedings and civil proceedings designed to prevent criminal activi-
ties. 123 Prosecutorial discretion falls outside the Prime Minister's do-
main only in theory. A Law Officer "is not subject to direction by his
ministerial colleagues or to control and supervision by the courts."'124
Such dicta contain more fiction than law.125 Thus, a power that Justice
115. As this Article was going to press, Margaret Thatcher resigned. See supra note 41. A
Conservative defender of the constitution might argue that recent history has vindicated the
constitution. It permitted a strong-willed leader to gain enough power to weaken the unions,
but eventually developed sufficient constraints to keep her from gaining too much power.
Time may tell.
116. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
117. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
118. G. MARSHALL, supra note 58, at 113.
119. Official Secrets Act 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 20).
120. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary provisions) Act 1984 (1984, ch. 8).
121. In one outrageous case, the Sun newspaper funded the prosecution of a doctor for the
alleged rape of a young girl. The paper was ultimately found in contempt of court for publish-
ing a series of articles during the trial that threatened the doctor's chance of a fair trial. The
paper was fined £75,000 for writing such headlines as "Rape Case Doe Groped." Attorney-
General v. News Groups Newspapers Ltd., The Times (London), Feb. 20, 1988, at 34, col. 2,
quoted in 0. HOOD PHILLIPS, LEADING CASES IN CONSITrUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 181-82 (6th ed. 1988).
122. Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, 1978 A.C. 435, quoted in 0. HOOD PHIL-
LIPS, supra note 121, at 194.
123. 0. HOoD PHILLIPS, supra note 121, at 194.
124. Id.
125. It is inconceivable that Thatcher did not oversee the prosecution of Peter Wright for
the publication of Spycatcher. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
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Scalia considers a "pure executive function" '126 has been distributed by
Parliament between the people and the government, with the executive
retaining the last word.
C. The Party Structures127
Although the British electorate retains the power of the ballot, the
highly centralized government structure recurs inside the two major par-
ties. This study of party structure confirms this Article's proposition
that the appointment and removal powers largely define any constitution.
L The Conservative Party
Both in structure and in ethos, the Conservative Party has always
been more centralized than the Labour Party. A group of Conservative
party leaders used to recommend a Prime Minister to the Crown, occa-
sionally embroiling the Crown in political controversy. For instance, in
1963 the Queen helped select the Earl of Home from the House of Lords
to succeed Harold Macmillan. 12 After suffering defeat twice in selecting
a Prime Minister under the leadership of Edward Heath, the Conserva-
tive Party established annual elections of the party leader by the Con-
servative MPs in the House of Commons in 1975.129 Margaret Thatcher
won the first such election, remembering ever since to be sensitive to the
backbench.1 31 Consequently, the Crown no longer retains a meaningful
role in the selection of the Conservative Prime Minister.
The Conservative leader appoints all significant officers to the Con-
servative Central Office, which coordinates the Conservative Party's elec-
tion efforts.131  The Central Office screens people aspiring to run for
office, creating a large "central list" from which the local constituencies
can choose their candidates.1 32 The Office also provides most campaign
126. Morrison v. United States, 487 U.S. 654, 708 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. Because their rivals have recently lost electoral power, we shall limit our inquiry to
the Conservative and Labour Parties. Several other political parties exist in the United
Kingdom, but they presently have few seats inside the House of Commons. The two major
parties provide enough examples of the crucial relationship between party organization and the
formal constitutional structure, a relationship ordinarily underemphasized in American
constitutional analysis.
128. M. BELOFF & G. PEELE, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.K.: POLITICAL AUTHORITY
IN A CHANGING SocIETY 218 (2d ed. 1985). By appointing a peer, the Queen violated the
convention that the Prime Minister should be a member of the House of Commons. Id.
129. The party leadership election rules for all major parties are set forth in R. BRAZIER,
supra note 49, at 260-66.
130. M. BELOFF & G. PEELE, supra note 128, at 219.
131. Id. at 227.
132. Id.
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finances' 33 and supplies background material to the MPs. 134
The Central Office's control over the selection of candidates is not
absolute; the local constituency party, run by local party activists within
each parliamentary district, retains significant discretion in choosing a
candidate from the central list offered by the Central Office.' 35 Local
constituencies meet together, as the National Union of Conservative and
Unionist Associations.'3 6 Although they remain independent from the
Central Office, the constituencies do not challenge their leaders' policy
decisions. 137
Because the major allocation of power occurs through the annual
election of the leader by the Conservative MPs, the annual party confer-
ence traditionally consists of a celebration of that leader and of the party.
"[T]he major function[s] conferences fulfill relate to propaganda, public-
ity[,] and the general integration of the various groups within the party
into a corporate whole."1 38
Aside from the annual election of the leader, backbenchers maintain
access to the leadership through the 1922 Committee, named in memory
of the year in which a group of Conservative MPs destroyed the Lloyd
George coalition by walking out of it.' 39 When the Conservatives are out
of power, all MPs are members of the Committee; when the Conserva-
tives control the House of Commons, only backbenchers sit on the Com-
mittee. 14 At any moment the leader, as Prime Minister, can place
backbenchers into government when the party is in power. 41 He or she
can also place them on the "Shadow Cabinet," a group of opposition
leaders who are assigned to cover each governmental department, should
133. Id. at 256.
134. Id. at 220.
135. This process explains one of Britain's peculiarities. The two major parties tend to
coalesce around a leader, and the electorate bases its vote in large part upon an assessment of
that leader, but the leader only runs for office in one district, which is so safe that there is little
chance for defeat.
136. M. BELOFF & G. PEELE, supra note 128, at 228.
137. The primary conflict between the constituency wing of the party and the Central Of-
fice has been over the assignment of "agents," professional campaign managers who assist local
MPs in their election efforts. So far the local constituencies have been able to retain popular,
effective agents whom the Central Office wanted to relocate to more contested districts. Id. at
227-28.
138. Id. at 226.
139. Id. at 224-25. Lloyd George, a Liberal, led a coalition government of Liberals and
Conservatives during World War I. Partisan politics resumed soon after the war, leading to a
Conservative M revolt that destroyed the coalition in 1922.
140. Id. at 225.
141. R. BRAZIER, supra note 49, at 66.
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the Conservatives fall out of power. 142
2. The Labour Party
The Labour Party is somewhat less centralized than the Conserva-
tive Party. 143 The Labour leader has far less power, particularly in oppo-
sition, because the Shadow Cabinet is elected by the Parliamentary
Labour Party (PLP), which consists of all the Labour Party MPs, instead
of being selected by the opposition leader.1" Consequently, powerful op-
ponents of the leader can maintain significant power within the party if
they are popular with enough of their colleagues. The Labour leader,
however, has the power to appoint all government officials whenever La-
bour becomes the ruling party, a power condemned by some of Labour's
more left-wing members. 145
The PLP in turn has less strength than the Conservative MPs. In
1980 Labour decided that the party leader must win an election at the
annual party conference in which the Parliamentarians would have thirty
percent of the vote, the unions forty percent, and the constituency parties
thirty percent of the vote.1 46 This voting breakdown creates factions
within the party, robbing it of internal strength. The Labour MPs also
have less authority to make policy than their Conservative rivals. The
Labour party considers its annual conference to be the ultimate source of
sovereignty.147 The conference consists of representatives from the un-
ions, local constituency parties, the MPs, and small socialist societies.14 '
The conference determines policies by two-thirds votes, conducts the
leadership elections, selects the National Executive Committee (NEC),
142. For a description of the politics behind Margaret Thatcher's appointments to her
shadow cabinet and her selection of trusted advisors when she was in opposition, see H.
YOUNG, supra note 41, at 104-18.
143. Labour has never consulted the Crown when presenting a triumphant leader to be
Prime Minister; they have already elected their leader. G. MARSHALL, supra note 58, at 29.
144. M. BELOrF & G. PEELE, supra note 128, at 228-29.
145. "This practice has been attacked, notably by [the left winger] Tony Benn. So far the
Labour Party leader has retained the prerogative: [appealing] to the conventions of the consti-
tution against the practices and expectations of the Labour Party." M. BELOrE & G. PEELE,
supra note 128, at 229.
146. R. BRAZIER, supra note 49, at 18.
147. The Labour Party Conference's power is somewhat limited in practice. To have any
effect, conference policy resolutions must be implemented by the parliamentary leaders
through the party election manifesto: "The Labour Party's election manifesto is... drafted by
the National Executive Committee in conjunction with the Labour [c]abinet or shadow cabi-
net, and until 1979 it was tacitly accepted that the leader had a veto over any item he consid-
ered objectionable-a privilege strongly resented by the left." M. BELOFF & G. PEELE, supra
note 128, at 231.
148. Id. at 232.
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and chooses the party's principal officers.149 The NEC controls the party
between conferences. The unions can dominate any conference vote;
each union representative has as many votes as he or she has members.1 50
Union votes must be cast as a block. Leaders of the five largest unions,
with approximately two and a half million members, must be courted by
everyone else in the party.
Labour's overall structure has not been as "democratic" as it could
be. Until recent conservative labour legislation, union leaders were
elected by open ballots, some for life. The unions also heavily influence
the NEC. They directly elect twelve of the twenty-nine members and
control six other seats through general conference elections.15 1 The un-
ions' power undercuts Labour's argument that it is more "democratic"
and "open" than the Conservative Party. 152 It is not self-evident that a
process where union leaders play a large role in making the crucial
choice of the leader is more "democratic" than the Conservatives' system
of making the leader accountable to elected officials within the party.
D. The Role of the Courts
The British courts are not as insulated from other branches of govern-
ment as the American federal courts. The Law Lords are members of
the House of Lords, a legislative branch, and their leader, the Lord
Chancellor, is a Cabinet member.1 53 The Lord Chancellor also serves as
Speaker of the House of the Lords.1 54 Such commingling of functions
probably led Professor Marshall, one of England's foremost constitu-
tional scholars, to deflate the doctrine of separation of powers: "In short,
the principle [of separation of powers] is infected with so much impreci-
149. Id. at 231.
150. The numbers tell the tale. "[T]he [Labour Party] membership had slumped in 1982 to
273,803 individual members with 57,131 from the socialist societies compared with 6,185,063
from the affiliated trade unions." Id. at 233.
151. Id. at 235. Some party leaders and union officials have recently made proposals to
reduce the unions' influence inside the party so that the party can attract more voters who are
wary of the Unions. Bagehot, Dumping Albatrosses, THE ECONOMIST, July 29, 1989, at 49,
col. 1.
152. The Labour Party has become more polarized and more ideological during the past
fifteen years. Neil Kinnock, the "soft left" party leader, has gained more power over local
constituency parties in an effort to purge the party of members of the Militant Tendency, a
Trotskyite faction. The overall result has been a party torn by shifting factions. "[D]ivisions
within the Labour Party can occasion a variety of alliances involving the PLP, the trade union
movement, and the constituency parties in different combinations at different times." M. BEL-
oFF & G. PEELE, supra note 128, at 245. The Labour Party, however, showed more cohesive-
ness during the 1989 Conference than they have for years. Bagehot, Not Like the Old Days,
THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 7, 1989, at 77, col. 1.
153. R. BRAZIER, supra note 49, at 119.
154. P. SILK, supra note 84, at 4.
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sion and inconsistency that it may be counted little more than a jumbled
portmanteau of arguments for policies which ought to be supported or
rejected on other grounds."1 5
The Law Lords do not accept Professor Marshall's conclusion. They
claim that "[a]lthough the United Kingdom has no written constitution,
it is a constitutional convention of the highest importance that the legis-
lature and the judicature are separate and independent of one another,
subject to certain ultimate rights of Parliament over the judicature."' 156
Certainly the Law Lords are largely immune from direct political pres-
sure. In his empirical study of the Law Lords, Alan Paterson concluded
that Law Lords are threatened by only a few, rarely used sanctions. The
Lord Chancellor, for example, can alter their case assignments if he dis-
approves of them 157 and can decide whether they can sit either on the
Privy Council or the House of Lords.1 58
Although impeachment remains a theoretical constraint, Paterson
was unable to find any efforts within the last one hundred years to re-
move a Law Lord for "deviance." 159 That time period may not be coin-
cidental; the Law Lords unambiguously adopted Dicey's doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty in the late nineteenth century."
One might conclude that the courts have not played a major role in
formulating the constitution or protecting individual rights. Yet the
courts helped design Britain's basic constitutional structure in the Case
of Proclamations, in which Lord Justice Coke held that the King did not
have the power to create new crimes or new criminal penalties, to define
new royal prerogatives, or to create new crimes via the Star Chamber.
1 61
These basic limitations of royal power were central issues of the Glorious
Revolution of 1688. They were also incorporated into the Bill of Rights
of 1689,162 which is Britain's closest equivalent to a written
155. G. MARSHALL, supra note 54, at 124.
156. Regina v. H.M. Treasury ex parte Smedley, [1985] 1 Q.B. 657 (C.A.). We should
never forget that Congress and the President can always use the appointment process to pack
the Supreme Court. They are restrained by convention, not fundamental law. One may not
like that fact, but it is a congressional power which is far less controversial constitutionally and
far more powerful than periodic proposals to allow Congress to alter constitutional decisions
through manipulation of federal court jurisdiction.
157. A. PATERSON, THE LAW LORDS 11 (1982).
158. Id.
159. Id. Paterson did not define "deviance," except to provide the example of Lord Hal-
isham's curtailing Lord Atkin for being too much of a reformer. Id.
160. British Railways Board v. Pichin, 1974 A.C. 765.
161. 12 Co. Rep. 74, 77 Eng. Rep. 1352 (K.B. 1611); see also Darcy v. Allein, 11 Co. Rep.
84, 72 Eng. Rep. 830 (K.B. 1602); Prohibitions Del Roy (Case of Prohibitions), 12 Co. Rep.
63, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (K.B. 1607).
162. 1 W. & M. Sess. 2, ch. 2.
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constitution. 1 63
The judiciary has an imperfect tradition of protecting individual lib-
erties through the common law.164 A British court outlawed slavery
under English common law.165 In a classic government seizure case, En-
tick v. Carrington, the Court of Common Pleas held that the executive
could not seize books and papers unless they had clear statutory author-
ity: "If it is law, it will be found on our books. If it is not to be found
there, it is not law."166 Unfortunately, Parliament subsequently gave the
government broad seizure powers in such statutes as the Official Secrets
Act. 67 The judiciary has increasingly deferred to the executive, particu-
larly whenever the executive argues national security. In Liversidge v.
Anderson, the House of Lords upheld oppressive detention orders based
on conclusory affidavits on a national security rationale during World
War 11.168 The judiciary still retains enormous power arising from its
essential obligation to interpret Parliament's statutes. The courts fre-
quently find that the government (not Parliament) has acted ultra
vires. 169 The courts can stop governmental actions which are (1) outside
the scope of the minister's statutory authority, (2) contrary to the pur-
pose of the statute, (3) misinterpretations of the statute, (4) violations of
"natural justice," or (5) irrational. These doctrines can be used very
aggressively.
Professor Griffith triggered a bitter controversy when he concluded
that the British courts have used these powers to protect conservative
interests. 70 Griffith noted that the courts were far more willing to find a
163. One should remember that the Bill of Rights is not a "constitution" because it is not
"entrenched." A bare majority of Parliament can pass a statute to amend or to eliminate the
Bill of Rights.
164. The British courts recently have become very active in defining and enforcing "natural
justice," the British variant of procedural due process. British courts have prevented the gov-
ernment and various associations from injuring a person because of bias, a denial of hearing, or
inadequate hearing procedures. See S. DE SMITH, supra note 92, at 569-82. Such decisions can
be overruled by statute, but they have generated an independent source of procedural fairness.
165. Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) Lofft 1, 98 E.R. 499, 45 Digest 389 (Rep). See A. DEN-
NING, LANDMARKS IN THE LAW 214-27 (1984).
166. 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765) (Lord Camden, C.J.), quoted in C.
TURPIN, supra note 68, at 48.
Governmental claims of necessity failed: "[With respect to the argument of state neces-
sity, or a distinction that has been aimed at between state offenses and others, the common law
does not understand that kind of reasoning, nor do our books take notice of any such distinc-
tions .... ." C. TURPIN, supra note 68, at 48.
167. Official Secrets Act 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 20).
168. 1942 A.C. 206.
169, See, e.g., S. DE SMITH, supra note 92, at 560-66.
170. J. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY (3d ed. 1985). Many lawyers were
angry because Griffith undermined the distinction between politics and law. The English bar is
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breach of natural justice when a police officer was fired than when stu-
dents, prisoners, or trade union members faced sanctions.171 Griffith's
most telling example was Bromley v. Greater London Council.172 The
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords held that the Greater London
Council (GLC), controlled by Labour, acted ultra vires when it cut pub-
lic transportation rates by twenty-five percent. The GLC, however, had
statutory authority to "[s]ubmit proposals for an alteration in the Execu-
tive's fare arrangements to achieve any object of general policy .... , 173
The Courts concluded that the GLC had a "fiduciary duty," which it
breached, to make public transport economically efficient.174
Griffith did not find such decisions surprising, partially because the
Lord Chancellor only appoints successful barristers. Most barristers
must come from moderately wealthy families because they received, until
recently, no income during their tutelage and little income during their
first years of practice. 175 "Oxbridge" emerges triumphant: "[F]our out
of five full-time professional judges are products of public schools, and
Oxford or Cambridge." 176 One should not, however, be too reductionist;
the Lords do not always favor the government or the Conservatives.177
II. A Comparison with the United States
A. Relative Strengths of the British System
Constitutional lawyers have compared the British and American
constitutions ever since the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The
General Index of James Madison's Notes of Debates in the Federal Con-
vention of 1787 contains sixty-one references to Great Britain.178 A.V.
Dicey frequently referred to the American Constitution in the course of
describing and evaluating the British Constitution.1 79  Numerous law
reviews have evaluated the two systems, comparing issues ranging from
remarkably steadfast in making the law/politics distinction, perhaps because their constitution
is so overtly political.
171. Id. at 163-78.
172. 2 W.L.R. 62.
173. J. GRIFFITH, supra note 94, at 208-13.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 28-29.
176. Id. at 28.
177. For example, the House of Lords held that private steel companies could not enjoin
their workers from going on strike to support a strike against British Steel Corporation, which
was publicly owned. Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 142.
178. J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 RE-
PORTED BY JAMES MADISON 666 (A. Koch ed. 1966).
179. There are 13 references listed in the index to the 10th edition of A. DicEY, supra note
48, at 534.
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the development of alternative dispute mechanism in divorce1 80 to judi-
cial selection. 8 '
The British frequently lose their customary reserve to praise their
constitution with a smugness that approaches arrogance. 1 2  Even
Charles Dickens' Mr. Podsnap could not top the conclusion of an MP
that "our constitution is the envy of the world." ' 3 Much of that self-
confidence has diminished along with the Empire and with Britain's eco-
nomic and political preeminence. Some critics believe that the British
constitution is a cause of Britain's decline. They accordingly advocate
radical reforms to increase prosperity.1 8 4 The sad truth may be that Brit-
ain's deterioration was inevitable, irrespective of its constitutional struc-
ture. Britain's relatively small land mass and population, class
rigidity,"8 5 and lack of natural resources may have doomed it to political
and economic mediocrity. Britain's slide gloomily rebuts the argument
that political and economic liberties must coexist (at least over the short
run) for nations to thrive. Countries such as India and Britain have lib-
eral politics but struggling economies, while South Africa and South
Korea have gained economic strength amidst political oppression. Com-
munist China's economy may grow after the slaughter at Tiananmen
Square.
Whatever its ultimate relationship to the country's economic and
political power, the British constitution has some obvious strengths. Its
longevity is a virtue, creating a blend of stability and change that has
180. See, eg., Miller, British Development in Alternative Dispute Resolution in Divorce, 2
B.Y.U. J. PUBL. L. 49 (1988). For a wider survey of governmental systems, see S. FINER,
supra note 42.
181. See, e.g., Atkins, Judicial Selection in Context: The American and English Experience,
77 KY. L.J. 577 (1988-89).
182. Written constitutions are no guarantee of protection from tyranny, much less of a
better organized, fairer society. Dicey explained how the British constitution protects civil
liberties better than many formal constitutions: "But any knowledge of history suffices to
show that foreign constitutionalists have, while occupied in defining rights, given insufficient
attention to the absolute necessity for the provision of adequate remedies by which the rights
they proclaimed might be enforced." A. DicEy, supra note 48, at 198. Dicey did not dispar-
age all written constitutions; he praised the American "statesmen" who gave constitutional
rights their "legal security." Id. at 200. But he warned that "general rights guaranteed by the
constitution may be, and in foreign countries constantly are, suspended." Id.
183. Mr. Podsnap explained: "We Englishmen are Very Proud of our Constitution, Sir....
It was Bestowed Upon Us by Providence. No Other Country is so Favoured as This Coun-
try." C. DICKENS, OUR MUTUAL FRIEND (1865), quoted in P. NORTON, supra note 108, at 23.
184. "When things go as badly as that, blame is not confined to those who work the sys-
tem, it implicates the system itself." T. Hickey, Constitution Under Mounting Attack, The
Times (London) (Jubilee Britain Supplement), Jan. 5, 1977,.at 1, quoted in P. NORTON, supra
note 108, at 28.
185. See I. REID, SOCIAL CLASS DIFFERENCES IN BRITAIN (1989).
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formed a relatively free and tolerant culture with significant degrees of
individual liberty. The constitution is both adaptable to changing cir-
cumstances and responsive to the will of the electorate. 186 Parliament
can radically change the constitution without wading through a lengthy,
supermajoritarian process.18 7 Parliament essentially "balances" every
detail of the British constitution. Politicizing all constitutional issues
keeps the citizenry more intimately involved with constitutional ques-
tions. Yet the citizenry does not see their constitution as a sacred text
created by extraordinary Framers and interpreted by exceptional Jus-
tices; the constitution is the political battleground.
Although the Prime Minister retains most governmental power over
the short run, he or she still must contend with many alternative sources
of power within and outside of this highly centralized government.
Other Cabinet members, often potential rivals, have a forum both to ex-
press their views and to demonstrate their executive expertise. Even
purged rivals who have returned to the back bench remain potential lead-
ers. ' In addition, the government must constantly explain itself in Par-
liament. The leader cannot hide from critics, appearing only at
occasional press conferences. The other ministers are constantly forced
to defend themselves on the media and against questions from their
"shadows." The Prime Minister is also checked by interest groups, the
electorate, the media, the markets, and other countries.
Britain's structure consists of limited checks and balances and a par-
tial separation of powers. The Prime Minister cannot lead alone, but
must always retain a majority in the House of Commons. After all, the
Prime Minister was only elected by a majority within one constituency;
he or she has no direct mandate from the entire country. Voters
throughout the country are indirectly but significantly influenced by the
leaders of the different parties. Both the Prime Minister and the House
of Commons have the power to force elections: the Prime Minister
through dissolution, the House of Commons with a vote of no confi-
dence. Judges are appointed for life. They are willing to strike down
186. English judges need not worry as much about "legitimacy" since any of their decisions
can be reversed by Parliament.
187. The Labour government authorized a referendum on its decision to have Britain join
the Common Market when Parliament passed a law requiring a referendum before devolving
certain of its powers to Scotland and Wales. The voters did not support the change in suffi-
cient numbers. See C. TURPIN, supra note 68, at 196-206. Although it could be argued that
referenda are now needed before any radical constitutional changes, the use of referenda is, at
best, an emerging convention.
188. Michael Heseltine, one such "purged rival," still gets cheers at the Tory Party Confer-
ences. Bagehot, Planning for Posterity, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 1990, at-66, col. 3; see also
Thinking the Unthinkable, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 1990, at 63-64.
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governmental actions that they perceive to be ultra vires. 89 Even the
House of Lords and the Queen provide some checks on abusive legisla-
tion or policies.
Because so much of the constitution is governed by convention, all
participants must be careful to observe the values contained within the
conventions underlying the basic structure. Otherwise, a majority in the
Commons might convert a convention into law. For instance, if the
Commons became sufficiently dissatisfied with the existing distribution of
power, it could pass a statute requiring elections for all Cabinet members
rather than selection by the Prime Minister.
The British pass statutes banning symbols and institute actions ban-
ning books, yet a climate of open, harsh debate still exists. Banning
books is rarely acceptable, and the British probably need the equivalent
of a First Amendment. Yet the American system may not prove supe-
rior over time. The English muddle may provide more freedom over the
next fifty years than American constitutional law. It is not clear who
should be trusted the most-the judges, the politicians, or the populace.
The British have gambled on majoritarianism, the Americans on a blend
of powers. Either approach may fail.
The United States Supreme Court's overt shift to conservative inter-
pretation should make American liberals a bit more sympathetic to the
widespread opposition to a Bill of Rights in Britain.' 90 The Supreme
Court's history of judicial activism by voiding the actions of other
branches of government has not always been inspiring, either in terms of
results or of consistency. Dred Scott,191 The Civil Rights Cases,192 Loch-
ner,19 3 Commerce Clause doctrine prior to 1937,194 National League of
189. See, e.g., S. DE SMITH, supra note 92, at 560-66.
190. The British left has been wary of constitutional judicial review because it probably
would protect the existing distribution of property. Socialism would be far easier to implement
in the United Kingdom than in the United States because Parliament would not have to con-
tend with the "takings" and "just compensation" requirements of the Fifth Amendment. U.S.
CONST. amend. V. For example, Parliament passed a bill explicitly overturning a House of
Lords decision that had required the government to reimburse an oil company for damages
incurred during World War II. Assuming that the United States Supreme Court would have
found the legislature's initial action to be a taking warranting compensation, it would probably
find any such "overturning" statute to be another taking, an ex post facto law, and an invasion
of the Court's power to enforce the Bill of Rights.
191. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (Congress could not prevent
slavery in the Territories).
192. 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (Congress could not pass a statute prohibiting racial discrimination
by private railroads, inns, or other places of public amusement).
193. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (states could not regulate the number of
hours that bakers could work).
194. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (Congress could not regulate child
labor).
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Cities v. Usery,195 Buckley v. Valeo, 196 busing,197 affirmative action,198
and the privacy cases (protecting abortion, 199 but not homosexuality)'o
demonstrate a lack of consistency and poor results. For instance, British
legislators, immune from judicial review under the doctrine of parliamen-
tary sovereignty, could quickly formulate and change affirmative action
plans.20 1 Their counterparts in the United States, however, must satisfy
numerous criteria that have been created by the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the Equal Protection Clause.2"2 Parliament can and does
severely regulate campaign expenditures,2 "3 while American campaign fi-
nance law is created by a bizarre mixture of statutes and constitutional
doctrine.20 4
B. Relative Weaknesses of the British Constitution
This Article is based on optimistic assumptions that some may dis-
pute. Those assumptions are that the United States and Britain are not
and have not been tyrannical, and that both countries have offered valua-
ble lessons to each other and to the rest of the world.20 5 Both countries
have created and expanded many individual rights and formulated civi-
lizing structures.
Continuing an ancient tradition of secrecy, the British government
willingly exercises its formidable powers to regulate speech. In 1987, the
police entered the studios of the British Broadcasting Agency and seized
several defense and espionage programs.20 6 The Thatcher administration
engaged in an extensive but futile attempt to block the publication of
195. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (states not required to comply with minimum wage and hour
requirements).
196. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Congress had limited powers to regulate financial contributions in
federal elections).
197. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1971).
198. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2997
(1990).
199. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
200. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
201. So far, affirmative action proposals have been very limited. See S. BAILEY, D. HARRIS
& B. JONES, CIVIL LIBERTIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 434-35 (2d ed. 1985).
202. See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
203. See 0. HOOD PHILLIPS & P. JACKSON, CONSTIUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 193-95 (6th ed. 1978).
204. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1129-53 (1988).
205. N. SHEEHAN, A BRIGHT SHINING LIE (1988). Many Vietnamese and Irish Catholics
have had different perceptions. The two countries' internal politics have not been immune
from barbarism either; one need only mention slavery. See R. FOSTER, supra note 67.
206. R. BRAZIER, supra note 49, at 98.
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Peter Wright's Spycatcher.2 °7 The British courts, initially deferring to
the government, finally concluded that the government's efforts had be-
come futile: "Any adverse effect which publication would be likely to
have on the readiness of the intelligence services to impart confidential
information to the British services had by now largely been suffered. '2 8
The ruling parties' willingness to invade liberties in response to the
continual violence caused by Northern Ireland has been equally dis-
turbing. The most chilling example occurred when the Republic of Ire-
land successfully challenged Britain's use of "techniques" to extract
information from Irish Republican Army suspects: forcing suspects to
rely mainly on their fingers to support themselves against a wall; placing
a hood on suspects except during interrogation; making loud and contin-
uous noises; depriving suspects of sleep, food, and drink.209 The Euro-
pean Court concluded that the techniques were "inhuman and degrading
treatment" and a violation of article three of the European Convention
on Human Rights.21 °
Following recommendations by a Commission headed by a Law
Lord, Lord Diplock, the government passed a bill denying alleged ter-
rorists the right to a jury trial.211 Lord Diplock's participation on the
Commission that studied the Northern Ireland dilemma sheds light on
Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils,212 reinforcing the argument
that judges should not participate on such committees. First of all, there
is something incongruous in having the judiciary ratify the suspension of
such a basic right. Second, conflicts of interest inevitably will arise. For
example, Lord Diplock also wrote an important decision upholding a
trial court's decision that a soldier who killed an unarmed man in North-
ern Ireland did not commit murder.2"' Such commingling of functions
only enhances any impartiality claims that terrorists might make in
207. The government attempted to prevent the publication of the memoirs of Peter Wright,
a secret agent. Wright both described his career and made some controversial allegations in-
cluding the charge that the security agency he worked for had undermined the Labour govern-
ment of Harold Wilson. See K. EWING & C. GEARTY, supra note 38, at 152-69.
For several months newspapes could not publish excerpts from the book, but one could
order the book by telephone from American bookstores.
208. Attorney General v. The Observer Ltd., The Times (London), Feb. 11, 1988, at 21, col.
6, quoted in 0. HOOD PHILLIPS, supra note 121, at 283.
209. K. EWING & C. GEARTY, supra note 38, at 211.
210. Ireland v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. Ser. A. 1978, reprinted in S. BAILEY, D.
HARRIS & B. JONES, supra note 201, at 213.
211. S. BAILEY, D. HARRIS & B. JONES, supra note 201, at 199.
212. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
213. Diplock upheld the lower court's finding that the defendant had an honest and reason-
able, though mistaken, belief that the victim was a terrorist. Attorney General for Northern
Ireland's Reference (No. 1 of 1975), 1977 A.C. 105, [1976] 2 All E.R. 937, [1976] 3 W.L.R.
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Northern Ireland, thereby undercutting any potential triumph of the
"rule of law."21 4
The benefit of flexibility can also be the cost of unchecked discretion.
On a day to day level, the Prime Minister has incredible power. On a
legal level, Parliament remains all powerful. The judicial power may be
partially separated, but ultimately is subservient to Parliament. This cen-
tralization has several costs aside from the increased risk of tyranny.
Commentators such as Philip Norton have complained about the dra-
matic, destabilizing swings in policy which occur whenever a new party
gains power. The majority party never needs the opposition party's co-
operation or votes.215 Norton argues that simply liberating the MPs
from the whips would force the leaders of both parties to be more accom-
modating.216 In addition, the opposition has less of a role to play because
it cannot control any branch and because the party system virtually elim-
inates the need for substantive compromise. The opposition thus has the
luxury of being shrill, adding to and reflecting the polarization that per-
meates Britain's class conscious society. Defenders of the adversary sys-
tem might reply that the institutional polarization is a worthwhile
reflection of society and that party discipline is necessary to implement
any meaningful changes.217 America's two party system, dominated by
lobbyists and campaign specialists, offers no real alternatives.
Neither legal system should be too smug. The British have not ade-
quately protected civil rights, but they have created statutory rights to
shelter and to health care.218 At the same time, the United States
Supreme Court has become increasingly enamored with two doctrines
that have Anglican implications: "balancing," which signifies flexibility,
and "deference," which strengthens majoritarian power. If the British
continue to be more influenced by their European neighbors, and the
Supreme Court continues its march to the right, the two constitutions
may become more similar.
235, cited in S. BAILEY, D. HARRIS & B. JONES, supra note 201, at 215-16. Diplock stated that
such factual findings are for the trial court judge or jury. Id.
214. The Catholic distrust of the English legal system is nothing new: the Northern Irish
Catholics lack "the necessary confidence in the judicial system as a means of securing justice."
K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, LAW AND STATE 11 (1975), quoted in S. BAILEY, D.
HARRIS & B. JONES, supra note 201, at 192.
215. P. NORTON, supra note 108, at 110-13.
216. Id.
217. See id. at 266.
218. National health insurance began with the National Insurance Act 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5,
ch. 8). In 1977 an Act was passed to protect the homeless. Housing (Homeless Persons) Act
1977 (ch. 38).
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C. Reflections on Cultures, Structures, and Rights
Two English traits-a wariness of ideology and a self-conscious cul-
ture-permeate British law. These characteristics even appear in the de-
bate over the quality of statutory language. As noted above, most British
statutes are drafted by a special group of lawyers, the Parliamentary
Counsel, under the direction of the relevant Minister and civil ser-
vants.219 Such centrality has not prevented criticisms familiar to Ameri-
can lawyers.220 British statutes have been assailed for being excessively
technical, complex, uncoordinated, and long. Critics contrast them with
continental systems that favor statutes which establish general principles
and use straightforward language. 221
Such criticisms trigger counter-attacks, even from critics of British
statutory language. Francis Bennion lambasted British statutes, but still
favored the British approach. His defense was based upon a mix of cul-
ture and anti-ideology: "'[T]he pragmatic British are chary of state-
ments of principle. They mistrust them because they invariably have to
be qualified by exceptions and conditions before being fitted for real
life.' ,1222 Bennion also observed that statutes drafted in general terms
transfer more power to the judiciary: "'We do not need, nor do most of
us desire, to be saved by our judges from the intentions of our
Parliament.' "223
Such pleas to culture (as well as to its close relative, tradition) and
to anti-theory do not fit easily with the dominant forms of American
egalitarianism. Probably responding to the need to integrate many differ-
ent cultures, Americans have tried to believe that culture does not matter
and that no real differences exist between ethnic groups or nations.
Americans prefer to rely upon principles that apparently transcend cul-
ture and history. The American left finds direction in economic and so-
cial equality, while the right locates it in the equality of the market place.
There is an excessive confidence in "reason." Consequently, Americans
of varying political persuasions are easily appalled at the sloppiness of
the British constitution: the continuing relevance of the hereditary mon-
219. See, eg., M. ZANDER, supra note 91, at 11-17.
220. See Dickerson, Legislative Drafting in London and Washington, 1959 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 49.
221. "The basic difference between the drafting of the [Continental] Code and that of the
[British] Act is that the draftsman of the Code clearly appears to attach paramount importance
to making himself readily intelligible to the citizen whereas the British legislator is at best
heedless of the user and at times even seems deliberately obscure .... ." Millett, A Comparison
of British and French Legislative Drafting (with Particular Reference to their respective Nation-
ality Laws), Autumn 1986 ST. L. REV. 130, 160; see also M. ZANDER, supra note 91, at 22-42.
222. Id. at 43 (quoting Francis Bennion).
223. Iad
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arch (who must state under oath that he or she is not a Papist),224 the
widespread commingling of functions and personnel, the lack of effective
legislative oversight, the centralization of power, and so on. When one
compares the two constitutions, line by line (even if some of the British
lines are unwritten), the American Constitution seems more effective,
fair, and coherent. I believe the American Constitution better balances
the rights and powers of the majority against the rights of the minority.
But there are few grounds for complacency. Nobody can answer the
most important question: which country will best protect their citizens
from internal and external tyranny over the next fifty years? Although
the American Constitution has a theoretically superior mode of govern-
ment, America's future will depend far more on its cultural evolution
than its legal constitution.225 Drug addiction, illiteracy, and greed are
greater threats to a free civilization than most commingling of powers.
One constitutional system may be more theoretically elegant but so-
cially inappropriate than another. Diverse, unrooted Americans need a
secular element, with sacred overtones, to bind them. They need an aris-
tocratic, antimajoritarian judiciary to keep their more primitive instincts
under control. Lacking common history, tradition, or even language,
Americans rely upon abstract standards and the rule of law to bind them.
By creating a life-tenured judiciary, the American Constitution institu-
tionalized an aristocratic element to counter the society's underlying
democratic, egalitarian ethos. Deference to the British aristocracy may
be so imbued in British culture that British judges do not need as much
power as their American counterparts. Both systems have worked mod-
erately well. Both societies, however, have an increasing need for hu-
mane judicial review. As American culture becomes increasingly
savage,226 it has an even more desperate need for nine verbal shamans
who create incantations out of the Sacred Text, the written Constitution.
At the same time, Britain is becoming both more culturally diverse,
which is a new source of strengths and weaknesses,227 and more primi-
224. The Bill of Rights (1688) (1 W. & M. Sess. 2, ch. 2).
225. Constitutional structure may be swamped by historical waves of evil. Margaret
Atwood describes in agonizing detail how armed force could sweep the American Constitution
away in The Handmaid's Tale. M. ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1987). Shooting all
the politicians and judges trivializes anxieties over separation of powers.
226. The most obvious manifestation of the country's increased savagery is the steadily
escalating violence and poverty among the "underclass." See, e.g., W. WILSON, THE TRULY
DISADVANTAGED (1987). For a more general indictment of the media's and the culture's
complicity in allowing brutal American aggression abroad, see E. HERMAN & N. CHOMSKY,
MANUFACTURING CONSENT (1988).
227. Britain has had many immigrants since World War II. They have helped rejuvenate
both the economy and the culture. Nevertheless, the country has lost some of the homogeneity
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tive, as reflected in persistent football hooliganism. These cultural ru-
minations reveal another difficulty the United States Supreme Court
faces when it tries to decide separation-of-powers cases. Not only should
it make a political assessment of the current balance of power, it should
also be aware of the culture's overall vitality. All of the above generali-
ties about Britain and America are open to debate and qualification, but
they nevertheless provoke difficult and disturbing questions. How stable
and unified is a country? How healthy is its culture? Who is being op-
pressed? How are they being oppressed? Judicial activism may be war-
ranted in one era or situation, but counterproductive in another,
undercutting the responsibilities of the politicians and the electorate.
With such difficult questions echoing in the background, it is now time to
reconsider the role of the Supreme Court in Young,228 Morrison,229 and
Mistretta.23
0
1I. Young, Morrison, and Mistretta Reconsidered in Light of
the British Constitution
Most of us have a sense of how to evaluate such individual rights issues
as racism, free speech, or abortion. We have less intuitive access, how-
ever, to complex structural problems. An indication of the subtlety of
structural cases is the unpredictability of justices' decisions.231 Indeed,
the three cases being evaluated in this Article place Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice Scalia, two leading judicial conservatives, on opposite
sides.232 Positions on separation-of-powers and federalism questions can-
not be reduced to contemporary versions of liberalism or conservatism.
The interpretive problems are difficult. How much weight should be
given to text, history, flexibility, and efficiency? The solutions are equally
difficult. Should a case be "balanced" or should a "bright line" be
drawn? One cannot begin to answer these questions without determining
that enabled it to flourish under such an informal constitution. The British constitution, domi-
nated by conventions, resembles a Victorian men's club almost as much as the actual layout of
the Houses of Parliament. It is far from obvious that such an ethos makes sense at the end of
this virulent century. Perhaps, however, such an ethic is what is desperately needed.
228. Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
229. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
230. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
231. For example, Justice Douglas, this century's most liberal justice, wrote a dissenting
opinion in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1986) (Douglas, J., dissenting), that provided the
basis for Justice Rehnquist's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976). Usery held that the Tenth Amendment prevented Congress from requiring the states
to comply with minimum wage and hour requirements.
232. Rehnquist joined the majority in all these cases, while Scalia dissented in two and
concurred and dissented in the other.
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the Court's primary responsibilities in fulfilling the Constitution's
purposes.
The principal purpose of the constitutional framework is far easier
to state than to implement: power must be sufficiently diffused to pre-
vent tyranny, yet adequately organized to allow its fair and effective
use.233 As James Madison explained, separation of powers is a crucial
device to prevent oppression:234 "The accumulation of all powers legisla-
tive, executive, and judiciary in the same hands, whether few or many,
and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pro-
nounced the very definition of tyranny. 2 35 Tyranny can appear in forms
other than concentration of power. One branch of government may per-
secute individuals or other branches, or the government can become col-
lectively impotent, unable to resist external threats.
The Supreme Court faces myriad problems in trying to prevent des-
potism. The most self-evident difficulty is that the Court is one of the
three federal branches; it must interpret its own constitutional powers to
avoid self-aggrandizement. The inevitable risk of self-aggrandizement is
dwarfed by some extraordinarily difficult assessments and predictions
that the Court must make to prevent excessive concentration of power in
either of the other two branches: which branch appears to dominate at a
given time; which branch is likely to become too powerful in the future;
what reverberations, such as loss of power, may result from any given
opinion; and what cumulative effect will a series of opinions have on the
balance of power over a period of years, even decades. The complexity of
the doctrine and the technicality of most of its issues make separation-of-
powers cases relatively inaccessible to the public. The Court, therefore,
can create virtually permanent changes in government organization be-
cause such alterations usually will not generate much controversy. Rela-
tively few people will know or care if the Court errs on many of these
issues. Finally, as analysis of the British constitution demonstrated, the
233. Justice Jackson expressed virtually identical sentiments in the Steel Seizure Case:
"While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government." Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Indeed, Jackson's
concurrence provides a perfect example of the contextual analysis that this Article endorses.
234. Oppression can take many forms. Professor Henkin described the Framers' fears
about excessive executive power in foreign affairs: "the Framers were hardly ready to replace
the representative inefficiency of the many with an efficient monarch, and unhappy memories
of royal prerogative, fear of tyranny, and distrust of any one man, kept the Framers from
giving the new President too much head .... ." L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 33 (1972).
235. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison) (Hallowell ed. 1842). The British constitution
somewhat undermines Madison's definition of tyranny because profound commingling of
power has not yet produced tyranny.
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Court needs to be aware of the historical and cultural climate of which it
is a part and that it perpetually helps re-create.
The concept of "necessity" largely explains the Court's choices be-
tween formalistic and balancing solutions. Anderson v. Dunn 236 serves as
a venerable reminder that "necessity" remains a vague and dangerous
concept:
If this power ... is to be asserted on the plea of necessity, the
ground is too broad, and the result too indefinite;... the executive,
and every co-ordinate, and even subordinate, branch of the govern-
ment, may resort to the same justification, and the whole assume to
themselves, in the exercise of this power, the most tyrannical
licentiousness.237
Any commitment to radical isolation of the three forms of governmental
power, however, must be sacrificed to the need for modern administra-
tive agencies. Congress cannot possibly define and enforce its numerous
regulatory statutes. For instance, it would be absurd to require Congress
to determine the precise water pollution technologies that are appropri-
ate for every industry, requirements which change as technology im-
proves. Agencies are needed to legislate. Formalistic theories could
force the federal courts to decide all social security claims, which number
in the hundreds of thousands. Agencies must adjudicate. The United
States Attorney is unable to enforce all the regulatory laws through pros-
ecution, inspection, and negotiation; agencies are indispensable for civil
law enforcement. After all, the doctrine of separation of powers coexists
with the doctrine of checks and balances; the latter's name implies a
flexible sharing of power. The issues in Young,238 Morrison,2 39 and Mis-
tretta240 can be reduced to the degree of deference that the Court should
give the other two branches (mainly Congress) when they reallocate ap-
pointment and removal powers, particularly criminal law powers. To
put it in legal terms: What burden of proof ought a branch seeking real-
location have in such cases, and how should that burden be met? The
British "experience" reinforces the formalistic argument that the Court
should not be deferential to novel congressional allocations of appoint-
ment and removal powers. The United States takes unknown risks when
it severs itself from its legal tradition of significantly separating powers.
Segregation of personnel is a good prophylactic device to prevent danger-
ous concentrations of substantive power. Commingling personnel be-
236. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
237. Id. at 228.
238. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
239. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
240. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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yond the modem administrative agency should be tolerated only when
absolutely necessary. So long as the principal members of each branch
are sufficiently segregated, tyranny is unlikely to occur even though such
substantive powers as the control of foreign affairs and the budget are
shared.241 Consequently, the Court should require Congress to satisfy a
heavy burden of proof in such cases, affirmatively demonstrating "neces-
sity." That burden should be far greater whenever one of the branches
attempts to commingle personnel who create and/or enforce the criminal
law.242 That burden should be even more severe in cases such as Morri-
son, in which one or more branches gain nontextual means to threaten or
remove principal members of other branches.
A. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils
In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils243 the Supreme
Court concluded that federal courts could assign disinterested, private
attorneys to investigate and prosecute criminal contempt allegations, but
only after requesting prosecutorial assistance from the United States At-
torney. 2 " The Supreme Court also asserted that federal courts could not
appoint interested parties as special prosecutors because such assign-
ments would create, at the very least, an appearance of impropriety.245
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia argued that federal courts could
not appoint private prosecutors to initiate criminal contempt proceedings
to enforce injunctive decrees because the courts only had "judicial pow-
241. Professor Feld rejects formalistic conceptions of separation of powers largely because
Congress and the President share the crucial powers of foreign affairs, the budget, and taxa-
tion. Feld, Separation of Political Powers: Boundaries or Balance?, 21 GA. L. Rlv. 171 (1986).
Feld argues that the Court should intervene "only to prevent one political branch from upset-
ting the balance and excluding the other from the decisionmaking process." Id. at 172. So
long as the two branches "consent," no separation of powers problems arise. Id. at 171.
242. The proposed standard is similar to the burden proposed by Maryland iii McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), but it also can be made consistent with Marshall's
grand synthesis: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohib-
ited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 421
(emphasis added). My emphasis indicates my argument; unwarranted commingling of person-
nel is inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
243. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
244. Id. at 800-02.
245. Id. at 811. Consequently, a federal district court judge erred in appointing the lawyer
who had previously represented the plaintiffs in a successful trademark infringement suit as a
special prosecutor to investigate and perhaps to prosecute the original defendant for alleged
contemptuous violations of the injunctive decree.
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ers. ' ' 2 4 6  Scalia harkened back to anti-union cases, such as In re Debs,2 47
and warned of judicial tyranny.24 8 He conceded, as a "necessity," that
courts must have the power to appoint attorneys to prosecute allegedly
contemptuous behavior within the courtroom. Judicial proceedings
could otherwise be impossible to conduct. Even for Scalia, the "core
function" of criminal prosecution cannot remain completely in the exec-
utive's hands. Exceptions to rules, nevertheless, do not defeat the need
for rules.
By undermining the proposition that prosecutorial discretion in
criminal cases is a core executive function, Young eviscerated separation
of powers beyond its holding. Chief Justice Rehnquist subsequently re-
lied on Young in Morrison. Scalia later found guilt by association in
Mistretta:
Today's decision follows the regrettable tendency of our recent sep-
aration-of-powers jurisprudence, See Morrison ... Young..., to
treat the Constitution as though it were no more than a generalized
prescription that the functions of the Branches should not be com-
mingled too much-how much is too much to be determined, case-
by-case, by this Court.249
The Young decision should remind us that tyranny can occur when
government officials dominate private individuals, as well as when one
branch intimidates members of another governmental branch. Because
federal judges can pick private prosecutors to investigate and enforce
their decrees whenever the Department of Justice refuses assistance, the
courts and their private prosecutors have unchecked use of the incredibly
powerful and discretionary weapon of criminal contempt.25 0 Giving the
courts this appointment power violates Scalia's formal doctrine because
it allows the courts to engage in an executive function. Moreover, it vio-
lates this Article's formal doctrine of segregating personnel in criminal
cases because it gives the courts the power to appoint a principal of-
246. Id. at 819 (Scalia, J., concurring). Once again we see the disruptive breadth of Scalia's
reasoning. It is a bit of a fiction to claim that the judiciary has only "judicial powers." Courts
legislate to some degree when they interpret laws and the Constitution. They also perform
executive functions when they enforce injunctions. Such commingling of power is inevitable.
247. 158 U.S. 564 (1895), cited in Young, 481 U.S. at 819 (Scalia, J., concurring).
248. Scalia also expressed concern about the extent of the holding. He saw no reason, aside
from judicial "self-love," why Congress could not now claim the same powers as the courts to
enforce its contempts. Young, 481 U.S. at 821-22.
249. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 426 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
250. Because criminal contempt proceedings can be initiated against civil defendants,
Young almost gives the federal judiciary the impermissible power to create and enforce com-
mon law crimes.
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ficer,251 a criminal prosecutor, in a criminal case. Allocation of this ap-
pointment power does not present a clear cut issue. Imagine the disaster
if the federal courts had no access to special prosecutors during the civil
rights movement and President Eisenhower had been unwilling to send
troops to insure integration in Little Rock?252 On the other hand, we
now risk possible judicial crusades against any group the judiciary finds
undesirable, as occurred against the labor union movement around the
turn of the century.253
The quest to make each branch efficient and independent can be car-
ried too far, aggravating tensions between the three branches. The
Court's emerging jurisprudence might enable each of the branches to op-
erate independently. Each branch could have sufficient personnel under
its control to intimidate either the citizenry or the other branches. This
development may generate a new form of checks and balances, but at a
higher level of conflict, as each branch brings its enhanced powers into
the fray against the others. Each branch would have less need for the
other branch's cooperation. One should not be too apocalyptic, however.
The British courts have similar powers to initiate contempt proceedings,
although virtually every contempt proceeding is handled by the govern-
ment.254  British judges may be conservative, but they have hardly be-
come tyrants.
B. Morrison v. Olson
Morrison v. Olson 255 may prove to have the greatest precedential
impact of the three cases examined in this Article.256 Not only did it
validate the important, controversial position of the special prosecutor,
251. Many, including the majority in Morrison, would disagree with the conclusion that
criminal prosecutors are "principal officers." It may not seem essential to require compliance
with the Appointments Clause, which mandates that all principal officers be nominated by the
Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Yet they should be "principal officers" in the sense that
criminal prosecutorial discretion is a core executive function that should be under the control
of principal officers who are accountable to the President. Thus, their superiors should be
"principal officers," not judges.
252. See T. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS 222-24 (1988).
253. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
254. Lord Denning describes the basic judicial contempt powers in A. DENNING, DUE
PROCESS OF LAW (1983). Only the Attorney General or the affected court can initiate under
the Contempt of Court Act 1981. See, eg., S. BAILEY, D. HARRIS & B. JONES, supra note
201, at 265-311.
255. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
256. We cannot predict how these three cases will influence the distribution of power. It
may turn out that the courts' power to appoint special prosecutors to investigate and enforce
contempt decrees will generate more injustice than all the special prosecutors. Certainly the
labor movement at the turn of the century, battered by cases such as In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564
(1895), would be more wary of Young than of Morrison.
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but it also virtually reaffirmed the constitutionality of independent regu-
latory agencies.
In Morrison the Supreme Court upheld the Ethics in Government
Act (the Act),257 repudiating a biting dissent by Justice Scalia. That Act
created an elaborate system to appoint special prosecutors who investi-
gate and prosecute federal executive officials suspected of violating fed-
eral criminal laws. Under the Act, the Attorney General must
investigate certain high-ranking government officials whenever he or she
receives information of alleged criminal conduct that is "sufficient to
constitute grounds to investigate. '258  If that initial inquiry generates
"reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution
is warranted," '259 the Attorney General must "apply to the division of the
court for the appointment of an independent counsel." 2" The chief jus-
tice then selects three federal appellate judges to sit on that Special Divi-
sion, appoint a special prosecutor, and establish the scope of that
prosecutor's jurisdiction.261 The judges can only terminate the prosecu-
tor's appointment after the case is completed.262 The Attorney General
can, however, fire the prosecutor for "good cause." '263
Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the textual arguments that the Act
violated the Appointments Clause of Articles II and III2" of the Consti-
tution. Rehnquist concluded that the Act satisfied a constitutional "bal-
ancing test": "[W]e do not think that the Act 'impermissibly
undermine[s]' the powers of the Executive Branch ... "265 The Chief
Justice, however, never set forth what powers are part of the executive
branch, nor what constitutes an "impermissible undermining" of those
powers. The Chief Justice failed to articulate, much less apply, any bur-
den of proof that Congress had to satisfy before creating this novel office.
In his Morrison dissent, Scalia employed the major forms of consti-
tutional argument-text, history, precedent, policy, fairness, accountabil-
ity, tradition, and the difficulties of applying "balancing" doctrines-to
support his position that the President must "have plenary power to re-
257. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 591-99 (West Supp. 1990).
258. Id. § 591(c)(1).
259. Id. § 592(a)(1).
260. Id. § 592(c).
261. Id. § 49 (West Supp. 1988).
262. Id. § 593(b) (West Supp. 1990).
263. Id. § 596(a)(1).
264. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONsT. art. III.
265. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988) (emphasis added) (quoting Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986)).
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move principal officers such as the independent counsel...266 whenever
those officers engage in "purely executive" functions.267 Scalia argued
that the creation of the special prosecutor violated the basic doctrine of
separation of powers, as expressed in the Constitution: "The executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. 2 68
Prosecutorial discretion, exercised by a special prosecutor in criminal
cases, is a quintessentially executive function.269 The Act, according to
Scalia, also clashed with the Appointments Clause270 because the special
prosecutor was a "principal officer" who should have been appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.271 Scalia then
attacked the majority for distorting precedent.272 Scalia cited Alexander
Hamilton to support his historical argument that the decision under-
mined the Framers' concept of separation of powers.273
Scalia also made several policy arguments. The special prosecutor
system could become unfair, dominated by partisan judges and special
prosecutors hostile to executive officers.274 Such excesses would remain
unchecked because "there would be no one accountable to the public to
whom the blame could be assigned. ' 271 Indeed, the system was inher-
ently unfair, even if partisan politics were absent: "How frightening it
266. Id. at 724 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia maintained that the majority misunder-
stood his opinion. His dissent does not require anyone who exercises any executive power to
be removable at the President's will. Id. Scalia's opinion, however, was not crystal clear. His
main thesis, which this author endorses, was that the President must retain power over "purely
executive" functions. In the same footnote, however, Scalia argued that "the President must
have control over all exercises of the executive power." Id. That sentence, taken literally,
might make all independent regulatory agencies unconstitutional because they exercise execu-
tive as well as adjudicatory and legislative power. In the text of his opinion, Scalia asserted
that his thesis did not threaten those agencies that find their constitutional pedigree in
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). But Scalia's endorsement of
Humphrey's Executor was hardly enthusiastic: "One can hardly grieve for the shoddy treat-
ment given today to Humphrey's Executor, which, after all, accorded the same indignity (with
much less justification) to ... Myers v. United States .... ." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 725-26
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
267. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 723 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
268. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
269. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
270. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
271. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 723-27; see infra notes 293-97 and accompanying text.
273. Scalia cited Madison's famous passage in The Federalist stating that each branch must
have "an equal power of self defense." Id. at 698 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322-23
(J. Madison) (Hallowell ed. 1842)). Scalia noted that the main power was the veto, but also
cited Records of the Federal Convention to show that the Framers never intended to divide
executive power. Id. at 699 (citing M. Farrand, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 (rev. ed. 1966)).
274. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 729-31 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
275. Id. at 731.
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must be to have your own independent counsel and staff appointed, with
nothing else to do but to investigate you until investigation is no longer
worthwhile-with whether it is worthwhile not depending upon what
such judgments usually hinge upon, competing responsibilities. 276
Scalia also attacked the majority's balancing test that upheld the
Act because it did not "impermissibly underminef the powers of the Ex-
ecutive Branch. '27 7 That vague standard substituted the Justices' beliefs
for the text of the Constitution: "Once we depart from the text of the
Constitution, just where short of that do we stop?" 278 Once again we see
Scalia's excessive devotion to formalism. Balancing is sometimes inevita-
ble and desirable. Scalia himself used a balancing test that was not part
of the text when he concluded that "necessity" permitted courts to ap-
point prosecutors to enforce internal proceedings.
The Ethics in Government Act279 violates this Article's suggested
presumption against conmingling personnel in criminal cases. The pre-
sumption can be partially grounded in constitutional text. First, the Act
takes a "core executive function," the prosecution of criminal cases, and
distributes that function among all three branches: Congress can request
a prosecutorial investigation; the executive has very limited power to
block that prosecution; and the judiciary will oversee the prosecution.
Consequently, the statute violates Article II of the Constitution because
Congress partially removed a central executive power, prosecutorial dis-
cretion over criminal cases, from presidential control. The Act also sub-
verted Article III because it embroils the judiciary in evaluating exercise
of prosecutorial discretion. Judges should not be allowed to supervise
prosecutors in criminal cases. The Act also conflicts with the Appoint-
ments Clause because it prevents the President from appointing, with
advice and consent of the Senate, a "principal officer," or an inferior of-
ficer who must be accountable to a principal officer.28
The Act also violates the presumption against giving one or more
branches novel, extraconstitutional means to remove members of another
branch. The Constitution limits Congress' removal powers over the ex-
ecutive to impeachment. Under the Act, Congress now has a quicker,
more effective weapon. There is no better way to remove someone from
government office than to convict them of a crime. Because the statute
has such a low triggering standard, the Attorney General has little power
276. IM at 732.
277. Id. at 695.
278. Id. at 711.
279. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 591-99 (West Supp. 1990).
280. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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to prevent special prosecutors from being appointed. If the standard
were much higher, there would be little reason for the Act; Congress
could attack the Attorney General for failing to exercise properly his or
her prosecutorial discretion despite the existence of powerful evidence of
wrongdoing. The Attorney General's capacity to remove a special prose-
cutor "for cause ' 281 is more illusory than real. The courts should and
probably will interpret "cause" very narrowly; otherwise, the Act has
little meaning. The Act's primary purpose is to insulate prosecutors
from executive control.
It is irrelevant that Congress does not select the specific prosecutor
when requesting investigations. Congress has narrowly satisfied the
holdings in Bowsher v. Synar and Buckley v. Valeo,z8 z which prohibit
Congress from directly appointing principal executive officials. The spe-
cial prosecutor is not under immediate congressional control, but he or
she knows that Congress started the process that created this prestigious,
high visibility job. Congressional critics of the government or of some of
its officials need not care who the special prosecutor is, so long as he or
she is sufficiently competent to pursue the named executive official. The
assignment is of limited duration and scope and demands limited skills
(primarily litigation). Congress can easily and quickly put any executive
officer's career and job at risk, knowing that a large number of competent
lawyers will be eager to become special prosecutors.283 This particular
congressional power comes not from having a chosen minion, but from
establishing a dangerous, extraconstitutional threat.
Morrison has created several new opportunities for Congress to in-
timidate the executive branch. As noted above, Congress has augmented
its ability to remove executive officials. Short of removal, Congress can
threaten executive officers with an independent prosecution.2" In addi-
tion, Congress may now be able to place any executive power inside an
independent regulatory agency. In his powerful critique of Morrison,
281. 28 U.S.C.A. § 596(a)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
282. The special prosecutor system also demonstrates that Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986) and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), do not, by themselves, sufficiently protect the
separation of powers.
283. Many competent lawyers exist, and the courts will have no trouble finding many able
volunteers who know the appointment will, at the least, enhance their careers.
284. One need only consider how Senator Joseph McCarthy might have used this tool. I
first learned that I had no rigid test of how to solve separation-of-powers issues after watching
Point of Order (Norton 1964), the documentary about the McCarthy hearings, during the
Watergate crisis. Senator McCarthy and Senator Ervin made the same arguments; attorneys
James Sinclair and Joseph Welch asserted similar forms of executive privilege. I know which
side was "right" in both situations, but I remain unsure as to which set of arguments, if either,
should be constitutionalized. That ambivalence, of course, permeates this Article, leading to
the Article's eventual devaluation of precedent.
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Professor Carter'fantasized about a congressional conversion of the State
Department into the "Foreign Policy Agency," followed later by trans-
formation of the Department of Defense into an independent regulatory
agency.2 85 Once the laughter subsides, the joke also disappears. 286 Now
that Congress can partially remove the coercive power of prosecutorial
discretion from the executive, perhaps it also can isolate the coercive
power of the military.
The executive, of course, has not become helpless. The President
has removal powers that can be exercised against Congress: the Justice
Department can prosecute members of Congress for crimes.287 The Pres-
ident can pardon executive officers at any stage of a special prosecution.
This pardon power,2 8 which one hopes will remain completely unre-
viewable by either Congress or the courts, remains a significant check.
But as Professor Carter observed, governmental officials cannot count on
being pardoned; nor will a pardon compensate for the stress and distrac-
tion of a criminal prosecution.28 9 The pardon power reconfirms the lack
of "necessity" for the special prosecutor. Since the President can pardon
anyone under criminal investigation or prosecution, the final constraints
remain political opinion and impeachment. Congress has not solved the
problem of executive corruption; it has relocated it in the Oval Office. If
the President is honorable, he or she will prosecute suspected criminals
within the executive; if not, he or she can still invoke the pardon power.
We already have seen that tyranny can occur through direct threats
to individual liberty, in addition to excessive concentrations of power.
Morrison v. Olson 2 90 not only created unnecessary opportunities for con-
gressional and judicial domination of the executive, it also authorized
serious threats to the individual liberties of executive officials. This Arti-
cle shall supplement Justice Scalia's powerful description of the unfair-
285. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REv. 105, 134 (1988).
286. Congress has already isolated the Federal Reserve Board, which exercises enormous
powers over the economy, from direct presidential control. See D. KETTL, LEADERSHIP AT
THE FED (1986).
287. The Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause is as important for what it doesn't cover
as for what it does cover; it is an implied authorization for prosecution as well as an immuniza-
tion. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. The clause creates two limited legislative immunities; during
congressional sessions legislators may only be arrested for certain crimes and they cannot be
arrested for anything they say in Congress. By implication, they may be arrested for specified
crimes at any time, and may be arrested for all other crimes when Congress is not in session.
The clause was based upon the English Bill of Rights: "That the Freedom of Speech, and
Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court
or Place out of Parliament." Bill of Rights (1688) (1 W. & M. Sess. 2, ch. 2).
288. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
289. Carter, supra note 285, at 112 n.26.
290. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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ness of the system by noting other costs of commingling personnel and
functions. The Court was satisfied with the appointment process because
any judge who participated in the selection of the special prosecutor
could not preside over that prosecutor's case.291 But eliminating the
most egregious violation of due process alone does not satisfy due pro-
cess. Several lesser conflicts of interest (or at least appearances of impro-
priety) remain.
Members of the Special Division, all of whom must be appellate
judges,292 will be among the leaders of the federal judiciary. Judges hear-
ing specific cases may be somewhat deferential to special prosecutors
(perhaps only on an unconscious level) lest they offend their influential
colleagues who made the appointments. Those judges who appoint spe-
cial prosecutors may have a unique regard for other special prosecutors
who subsequently appear before them. Judges who desire promotion
(perhaps even to the Supreme Court) will be aware that their perform-
ance on the Special Division will be studied closely during any subse-
quent confirmation hearing, even though there are no conventional
judicial criteria to evaluate the performance. Finally, criminal defend-
ants must feel particularly vulnerable when they are being pursued in
court by judicially appointed and controlled prosecutors. The costs of
the increased politicization of the judiciary outweigh the benefits.
As Scalia bitterly observed, the Morrison Court's analysis of prece-
dent also revealed its preference for balancing doctrine.293 In his discus-
sion of the two most relevant cases, Humphrey's Executor v. United
States294 and Myers v. United States, 295 Chief Justice Rehnquist ignored
Humphrey's Executor's actual distinction of Myers, and concluded that
Humphrey's Executor allowed widespread commingling of powers and
personnel.296 Humphrey's Executor was in fact far narrower. It distin-
guished Myers only on the ground that Myers, a postmaster, engaged in
executive functions while Humphrey, a Federal Trade Commission offi-
cial, also participated in "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-adjudicative"
291. Id. at 683.
292. The Special Division is a "division of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia." 28 U.S.C.A. § 49 (West Supp. 1988).
293. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 726-27.
294. 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (President could not summarily remove member of the Federal
Trade Commission after Congress had held that President could dismiss a commissioner for
"inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office").
295. 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (President could fire postmaster because President has exclusive
power of removal of executive officers whom he has appointed by and with advice and consent
of Senate).
296. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685-93.
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functions.297 Consequently, the Humphrey's Executor distinction actu-
ally threatens the special prosecutor, who is engaging in a purely execu-
tive function. Myers admittedly suffers from having used the vacuous,
limiting adjective "quasi." But the solution is to eliminate the adjective,
not the decision. If separation of powers is to have any meaning, the
Court must define "executive," "legislative," and "judicial." It also must
determine what parts of those defined powers are "core powers" or "core
functions," warranting heightened scrutiny and intensified defense when-
ever another branch seeks to use those powers or dominate the officials
administering those powers. The Court must create a doctrine to protect
those concepts. The part of that doctrine that covers appointments and
removals in criminal law areas should be presumptively formalistic at
this particular time in history.
It is easy to attack such malleable, conclusory concepts and catego-
ries as "executive" or "core function." We need words, nevertheless, to
capture the underlying tensions that permeate constitutional law. Once
again Morrison is instructive. One can legitimately argue about the defi-
nition of "executive powers" and what comprises its "core functions."
But until Morrison, prosecutorial discretion in criminal cases tradition-
ally was at the heart of executive power.
The special prosecutor decision minimized a value that the British
weigh far more heavily than Americans: "tradition." One need only
consider the royal family to see the British adoration of tradition over
democratic theory or common sense. 298 The tradition argument contains
several subsidiary arguments. Tradition is a more sophisticated version
of the quip, "If it works, don't fix it." Tradition is an acknowledgment of
our ignorance. Because we do not completely understand the past, the
present, or the future, we should be wary of discarding existing govern-
mental structures and solutions. Tradition weighs experience at least as
heavily as theory or consistency. It is stare decisis writ large. Although
the Morrison majority could construe Humphrey's Executor as a partial
precedent, Morrison ignored the two-hundred-year American tradition of
prosecutorial discretion in criminal cases. The constitutional system had
already developed adequate ways to prosecute powerful criminals within
297. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 626.
298. For example, the Bill of Rights requires that the King or Queen be a Protestant, Bill
of Rights (1688) (1 W. & M. Sess. 2, ch. 2), and that only Protestants have a right to bear
arms. Id. Thomas Paine rhetorically asked and answered: "But, after all, what is this meta-
phor called a crown, or rather what is monarchy? Is it a thing, or is it a name, or is it a fraud?
... It appears to be something going much out of fashion, falling into ridicule, and rejected in
some countries both as unnecessary and expensive." T. PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 146-47
(1791).
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the executive, as seen during the Watergate affair. President Nixon re-
tained the power to terminate the special prosecutors who were chasing
him and his associates. His final constraints were (and should have been)
public opinion and congressional impeachment power.2 99
Morrison also reconfirmed the slippery nature of balancing tests.
Balancing tests vary depending upon the factors the court chooses to in-
clude, the weight given to those factors, the allocation of burdens of
proof for each of those factors, the precise definitions of those burdens of
proof, the precise evidence needed to satisfy those burdens and, above all,
the final results of the decisions. Since a balancing test never automati-
cally determines the results, one can never know a test's true meaning
until it has been applied in several cases." Morrison was particularly
disturbing because Chief Justice Rehnquist never made an independent
assessment of the "necessity" for special prosecutors. In fact, Rehnquist
never considered necessity to be a relevant, much less essential, factor.
Congress did not have to meet any articulated burden of proof before
removing significant amounts of prosecutorial discretion from the execu-
tive. Thus, the decision has provided no guidance on how the Court
should decide future appointments cases.
The doctrine of separation of powers serves major objectives other
than preventing tyranny.301 A presumptively formalistic approach to
299. This example demonstrates the subtle mix of doctrines. I have assumed that the Presi-
dent can be impeached for refusing to cooperate in an investigation of the executive. Thus,
Congress could properly impeach President Nixon for failure to comply with a subpoena. See
Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeach-
ment Process, 22 UCLA L. Rnv. 30 (1974). For a contrary view, see Van Alstyne, The Third
Impeachment Article: Congressional Bootstrapping, 60 A.B.A. J. 1199 (1974).
This tangent reinforces a basic theme in the Article. I could have a different view of the
constitutionality of the special prosecutor if the Supreme Court had or would limit congres-
sional impeachment power. One should not evaluate structural doctrine in isolation.
300. For instance, all the justices agree that they should use intermediate scrutiny, a pure
balancing test, in sex discrimination cases. They radically disagree on how that test is to be
applied. Thus, the application of the doctrine has become as important as the doctrine itself.
Compare Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (Congress cannot provide benefits to chil-
dren of unemployed fathers while denying such benefits to children of unemployed mothers)
with Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (Congress can exclude women from pre-draft
registration).
301. Separation of powers allows more individuals and more factions to participate in gov-
ernance. Our system virtually institutionalizes the three basic factions that exist in any society:
the courts are the bastion of the aristocracy; Congress is the forum of democracy; and the
presidency is the expression of monarchy. Separation of powers also delays the implementa-
tion of policy, thereby formalizing reconsideration. To put it more darkly, separation of pow-
ers makes government less efficient, which is a good in itself, given human nature.
Another virtue of separation of powers is that it frequently allows rival parties to share
power, as has frequently been the case since World War II. The Republicans have controlled
the Presidency and the Democrats have dominated Congress. Thus both parties learn the
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separation-of-powers cases involving appointments and removals en-
hances political accountability by reducing confusion and, in the princi-
pal cases, by keeping much of the power over criminal law in the hands
of elected officials instead of partially with the judiciary.3 "2 Political ac-
countability, in turn, reduces the likelihood of tyranny, implies consent
between the governors and the governed, and is consistent with demo-
cratic principles. In his Morrison dissent, Scalia pointed out that the spe-
cial prosecutor was politically unaccountable; once he is appointed, his
primary employer is a group of unelected judges.303 The special prosecu-
tor's unaccountability is increased by the extraordinary complexity of the
process. For example, few citizens will ever know how the government
processed the Oliver North trial.3" Who made the crucial decisions
when the Justice Department, the State Department, the special prosecu-
tor's office, the defense counsel, and the trial judge met in their many in
camera sessions? Normally such questions are somewhat unnecessary
since there would be only one prosecutor, representing the entire execu-
tive branch. The citizenry previously could make some overall assess-
ment of the handling of the trial, including any plea bargains, even if they
did not know the details. Now we will be uncertain as to who made what
deals with whom.
A confused public also will be less able to determine how different
parts of the constitutional structure influence each other. The average
person can more easily grasp formalistic approaches and determine cau-
sation and responsibility. If the system becomes unstable or weak, the
body politic can conceptualize appropriate amendments to the Constitu-
tion. But if the Supreme Court uses more and more balancing tests, the
public will have less understanding of how powers are allocated. In addi-
tion, they will face the problem that any proposed amendment, no matter
constraints of power and gain needed experience. Under the British system, the losing party
has virtually no responsibilities except to criticize the government. Consequently, when a
party is out of power for a protracted period of time, as is presently the case with the Labour
Party, its leaders may not be gaining any practical experience in administering power, nor are
they able to demonstrate to the electorate that they are capable of running the government.
The American Constitution's federalist structure also serves this function of providing a mean-
ingful forum for the opposition. Some defenders of the British constitution might reply that
this commingling of responsibilities explains why the two major American parties so closely
resemble each other, thereby offering the electorate no meaningful choice.
302. In all three cases the unelected judiciary gained power. The courts can now appoint
special prosecutors who will investigate and prosecute alleged criminal contempts outside the
courtroom, appoint and oversee special prosecutors who will investigate and prosecute execu-
tive officials, and sit on commissions that significantly determine the substantive content of
criminal law.
303. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 730 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
304. See, e.g., H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SEcuRrrY CONSTITnION 22-37 (1990).
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how carefully drafted, may be whittled away by subsequent judicial
balancing.
I shall conclude this section by more directly comparing practices in
the United States with those in Britain. First, it is inconceivable that the
Thatcher government would ever have drafted and passed a bill creating
special prosecutors. Immersed in the English tradition of secrecy,
Thatcherites opposed minimally intrusive checks on executive power,
such as a Freedom of Information Act. 05 If a Parliament were to pass
such a bill, however, it would promptly be upheld by the Law Lords
under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Recall that the execu-
tive does not completely control prosecutorial discretion. Private citi-
zens have the common law right to initiate criminal prosecutions, even
though the Attorney General can terminate any prosecution.0 6 This
common law right can be eliminated by statute. Many statutes, such as
the Official Secrets Act,30 7 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act of
1984,308 give the government sole authority to commence criminal
proceedings.
These details cut both ways. Morrison supporters can argue that the
ad hoe system of criminal prosecution that exists in Britain demonstrates
that prosecutorial discretion is not a "core executive function." Nor is it
"necessary" to give the executive complete control over all criminal pros-
ecutions. Critics can reply that such British informality typifies that
country's insufficient separation of powers, a tradition that may have
worked for that country but which could be catastrophic in the United
States. They also can point out that the executive retains prosecutorial
discretion over most important crimes (particularly "political" crimes),
can exercise its power to dismiss any prosecution, and can pass legisla-
tion reallocating prosecutorial discretion whenever it wishes. The solu-
tion to excessive executive discretion in Britain is to enhance the
investigatory power of Parliament, particularly the backbenchers, not to
dilute the traditional executive control over prosecutorial discretion.
C. Mistretta v. United States
The majority in Mistretta v. United States309 held that Congress
could create a Sentencing Commission, which promulgates guidelines
that determine the amount of discretion a federal judge has in sentencing
305. G. MARSHALL, supra note 58, at 113.
306. See, eg., P. BIRKINSHAW, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION (1988); see also supra notes
116-126 and accompanying text.
307. Official Secrets Act 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 20).
308. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 (1984, ch. 8).
309. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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criminals. Two members of the Sentencing Commission, however, were
article III federal judges. 1° The Court rejected arguments that Congress
had improperly delegated its legislative power and that article III judges
could not sit on such a commission.3" Justice Scalia's Mistretta dissent
maintained that the Sentencing Commission was unconstitutional be-
cause Congress had delegated its "lawmaking powers" to an agency lo-
cated partially in the judiciary, which had no functions other than
lawmaking.312
The attack on the federal sentencing board does not generate daz-
zlingly high stakes. If the Court had drawn a bright line prohibiting fed-
eral judges from sitting on any commissions making substantive law,3" 3
judges could still formulate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence and supervise their internal proceedings
through the Judicial Conference. Legislative or executive usurpation of
judicial regulation of the courtroom's internal workings raises another
set of separation-of-powers issues. Under such a bright-line rule, judges
would only be prevented from participating in such groups as the Sen-
tencing Commission, investigatory commissions, or substantive law com-
missions. Certainly the losses of judicial experience and of the judicial
aura of political impartiality would be real, but hardly catastrophic. The
costs of participation are higher. When judges are allowed to sit on sub-
stantive or investigatory commissions, they may be tempted to make
political decisions to increase their chances for promotion or for addi-
tional assignments to such prestigious and highly visible committees.
They may in addition get embroiled in partisan politics. The Mistretta
majority dismissed such concerns: "We simply cannot imagine that fed-
eral judges will comport their actions to the wishes of the President for
the purpose of receiving an appointment to the Sentencing
Commission." '314
Even if one concludes that Mistretta did little damage, there is no
need to commingle personnel by offering discretionary awards and pun-
ishments. Indeed, some significant risks have been created. J. A. Clar-
310. Id. at 361.
311. Id. at 371-79, 405-08.
312. Scalia turned to James Madison to reinforce his consternation over the Court's contin-
ued creation of dangerously fluid constitutional doctrine. Id at 426 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
313. Once again I have applied a distinction that often has been criticized: the distinction
between substance and process. Admittedly the distinction is unclear. Procedural and eviden-
tiary rules obviously have substantive overtones. Nevertheless, judicial control of internal pro-
cess, of how a decision is reached, seems to be an essential part ofjudicial independence. Scalia
adds in his dissent that Mistretta may threaten that aspect of judicial autonomy by permitting
Congress to create mixed agencies to formulate such rules. Id. at 425-26.
314. Id. at 410.
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ence Smith concluded that the French judiciary never developed as
strong a tradition of autonomy as the Anglo-American judiciary, which
has been far more willing to intervene on behalf of the individual against
the government, because the French judges were so dependent upon the
other branches for promotion.315 Finally, placing judges on substantive
law commissions undercuts their image of neutrality. Lord Diplock, for
example, served on the Commission that studied Northern Ireland and
eliminated the right to jury. He subsequently decided cases where the
litigants lost their right to a jury.3 16
Justice Scalia never made "temptation" or "conflict of interest" ar-
guments. He dissented from Mistretta on the ground that Congress im-
properly delegated its powers because the Sentencing Commission
engaged in purely "legislative" functions, unguided by "intelligible" stan-
dards from Congress. 3 17 He drew a constitutional distinction between
agencies that make law in the course of executing laws or adjudicating
laws, as opposed to those that only make laws.31 Scalia also was dis-
turbed because the "independent" agency was apparently located within
the judiciary, taking away powers that should remain in the hands of the
judges: "[U]nlike executive power, judicial and legislative powers have
never been thought delegable. '319 That broad statement is wrong; wit-
ness the power of administrative law judges. Mistretta reconfirms the
radical nature of Scalia's separation-of-powers jurisprudence; he aggres-
sively seeks to define, expand, and isolate the three functions whenever
possible. Scalia does not fully explain why delegating legislative powers
to a group that only legislates violates the separation of powers, but dele-
gating similar power to an agency that also exercises executive and legis-
lative powers is constitutional. One might think the opposite made more
sense. If Congress cannot delegate legislative powers, virtually all ad-
ministrative agencies that issue voluminous rules are at risk. Further-
more, any attempt to force all adjudications into the federal courts would
swamp those courts with millions of claims.
This Article's approach, when tempered by precedent and tradition,
does not reach as far as Scalia's vision. The Sentencing Commission
would be unconstitutional because article III judges were appointed by
the President to affect substantive criminal law, not because the commis-
315. Smith, Legislative Drafting English and Continental, 1980 ST. L. Rnv. 14-22, quoted
in ZANDER, supra note 91, at 28-35.
316. The Diplock Commission's work is described in S. BAILEY, D. HARRIS & B. JONES,
supra note 201, at 199-200.
317. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
318. Id.
319. Id at 425.
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sion only legislated. Much of Scalia's reasoning remains essential, how-
ever, for this narrower presumption to work. The Court must make
initial definitions of the governmental functions, particularly at their
"core." Preliminary definitions can be combined with the presumption
against commingling of personnel to coherently resolve contemporary
separation-of-powers cases. Courts must be able to control their own
courtrooms. 320 Executives must be able to exercise prosecutorial discre-
tion in criminal cases. Congress must retain the power to alter delegated
legislation. Administrative agencies are part of the constitutional fabric,
even if they undermine pure conceptions of separation of powers. We
should be wary, however, of letting the doctrinal informality that incor-
porated those agencies seep into all other separation-of-powers issues.
This Article has proposed and defended a narrow presumption, lim-
ited to criminal law, that fits the facts of Young v. United States ex rel.
Vuitton et Fils,321 Morrison v. Olson,322 and Mistretta v. United States.323
Formalists should be reluctant to propose doctrine that automatically
extends far beyond the specific issues; aggressive judicial formalism un-
dercuts future judicial discretion needed to respond to unforeseeable
issues.
The Supreme Court should have a broader goal of preventing the
leaders of any branch from obtaining new means to punish or to reward
members of the other branches. When we consider that broader objec-
tive, we can see that the proposed presumption obscures some crucial
differences between the three cases that it covers. Young removes a part
of a core function and gives that function to another branch. Even
though it involves an appointment, such sharing of powers is disturbing
but does not constitute the greatest threat to separation of powers. It
would be difficult for one branch to strip another branch of most of its
powers so long as the aggressive branch could not also remove the other
branch's members. Mistretta is more worrisome because it permits mem-
bers of one branch to hire and to fire, to reward and to punish, members
of another branch, but only for "extracurricular activities." Thus Morri-
son turns out to be the most dangerous case because it violates all of the
values this Article is defending: it both removes a traditional core func-
tion from the executive branch and creates a novel weapon that Congress
can use to terminate and to intimidate members of the executive, threat-
ening not just their jobs, but also their personal liberty.
320. This proposition threatens those statutes that preclude judicial review.
321. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
322. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
323. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
[Vol. 18:125
HeinOnline  -- 18 Hastings Const. L.Q. 178 1990-1991
IV. Stare Decisis Reconsidered
The reader may still be uncomfortable with the proposed resolution
of the three principal cases. The British constitution, after all, demon-
strates the value of flexibility. Rigid doctrinal formalism, which usually
has influence beyond the facts of the case, arguably is the worst solution
to separation-of-powers problems.
Once again the British constitution enlightens. We have already
considered one important lesson of the British constitution: concentra-
tion of appointment powers can easily lead to concentration of other
powers. At one time the Prime Minister was "first among equals."
Thanks to the power to hire and fire, he or she still dominates party and
nation.324 Such concentrations of power reinforce this Article's primary
argument that the Supreme Court should presumptively separate hiring
and firing within the three branches, especially in criminal cases. The
British constitution also proves, however, that flexibility is necessary for
longevity. None of us can predict how or where the next wave of tyranny
will surge. The aspiring tyrant might be a McCarthyite member of Con-
gress, a Nixonian President, a religious fanatic, a group of military of-
ficers, an angry mob, or a foreign dictator. The next crisis may be
economic, cultural, educational, environmental, or military.
We can begin to solve these dilemmas at two levels of abstraction.
First, the Court never should forget that its primary obligation is to pre-
vent tyranny. Second, the Court can best fulfill this admittedly abstract
goal by giving less weight to its prior decisions in structural cases than
elsewhere, given the inherent limitations of judicial review. In short, the
Court should not let adjudicatory aesthetics prevail, particularly if its
prior structural decisions have helped create a grievous political imbal-
ance of power. The Supreme Court's structural decisions should be con-
sidered experiments, not immutable canon. The British constitution
demonstrates that the relationship between structure and freedom is ex-
tremely ambiguous. Indeed, one of the "problems" all theorists face in
this area is that the American system has been able to weather prior
Supreme Court structural decisions, whatever their specific resolutions.
Formalists such as Justice Scalia may end up crying wolf too often if they
see tyranny and the destruction of separation of powers in every commin-
gling or balancing decision. Nor should the balancers expect to see the
government strangled by a series of formal decisions. We must never
forget that the constitutional text assures far more separation of powers
than has ever existed in Britain, establishing three powerful institutions
324. See, eg., H. YOUNG, supra note 41.
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that are unlikely'to lose most of their power. Additionally, public opin-
ion must remain the last, most important defense against excessive con-
centration of power.
The debate over the role of precedent in constitutional adjudication
has already taken on renewed energy due to shifts in the makeup of the
Supreme Court.325 Conservative commentators such as Richard Posner,
irritated by remaining liberal decisions, have minimized the weight of
constitutional precedent.326
The legal academy has continued its task of systematically separat-
ing and evaluating the different forms of acceptable legal argument, in-
cluding precedent.327  Devaluing precedent conflicts with Professor
Monaghan's recent suggestion that the Court should give stare decisis
more weight in constitutional adjudication. 328  Monaghan describes
some of the values that stare decisis fosters: efficiency, equal treatment
of parties over time, consistency, predictability, stability, tradition, im-
personality, conservatism, legitimation, and idealism. Monaghan, who is
trying to preserve a form of originalism that honors the public under-
standing of the Constitution's language when it was created,3 29 concedes
that many major court decisions conflicted with original understanding:
the increase in federal power at the expense of the states, 330 the expansion
of civil liberties, 331 the growth of the administrative state,332 and the ex-
tension of presidential power.333 Monaghan's solution is to stop addi-
tional non-originalist adjudication, while preserving those parts which
are "too central" to be altered.334 Monaghan acknowledges that the doc-
trine of stare decisis can always be characterized as a rhetorical facade
because there is no theory of how much weight it should be given in
different cases. 335 The doctrine is particularly suspect in constitutional
cases because most "wrong" constitutional decisions can be changed only
by the cumbersome amendment process or by judicial reversal. 336 Nev-
325. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
326. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS 213 (1985).
327. Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571 (1987).
328. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723
(1988).
329. Id at 725.
330. Id at 730-34.
331. Id at 727-29.
332. Id at 735.
333. Id at 736-39.
334. Id. at 750.
335. Id. at 743. That critique can be made against every form of legal argument.
336. In United States v. Scott the Court stated that
in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative ac-
tion is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The
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ertheless, he believes that non-originalist decisions must be accepted
before any form of originalism can successfully be implemented in the
future.337
On first impression, there seems to be little common ground for this
Article and Monaghan's proposals. Monaghan relies upon a particular
blend of constitutional reasoning-originalism and stare decisis-to best
fulfill the Framers' purposes. As was the case with "political accounta-
bility," I remain wary of any theory or interpretive technique that dis-
tracts the Court from its primary duty to battle tyranny. For instance,
Monaghan seems to accept Roe v. Wade338 reluctantly, even though it
was wrongly decided by originalist standards, in part because Roe has
been so hotly contested. 339  But Monaghan then states that the Court
properly refused to extend the privacy protections given to women seek-
ing abortions in Roe to homosexuals in Bowers v. Hardwick.3 ° I believe
the continued legal oppression of homosexuals is a blatant form of tyr-
anny. Monaghan might reply that my observation proves his argument
that such standards as "opposition to tyranny" operate at such a high
level of generality that they fail to generate meaningful constraints, even
while claiming to have an originalist pedigree. 34 1 Nevertheless, we first
must determine if Monaghan and I have the following basic premise in
common: the Court's primary responsibility is to combat tyranny.
Another look at Monaghan's thesis reveals many similarities to this
Article's analysis. First, this Article proposes how the Court should
weigh constitutional precedent: the Court should give less weight to
structural decisions than to individual rights cases. Thus the Article is
expanding upon Monaghan's goal of developing a theory of precedent.
Second, this Article largely bases its jurisprudence upon its author's per-
ceptions of the Framers' dread of tyranny; history still matters. But even
on more specific issues our thinking tends to converge. For instance,
Monaghan concedes, during his discussion of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,342 that the need to combat oppression can override precedent:
Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing
that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate
also in the judicial function.
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978) (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285
U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
337. Monaghan, supra note 328, at 723-24.
338. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
339. Most prior decisions will last under one of Monaghan's tests, because they will be
"central," inconsequential, or bitterly contested.
340. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
341. Monaghan, supra note 328, at 739.
342. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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"Moreover, it seems doubtful that stare decisis is ever properly invoked
to bar the claims of any group prevented from constructing the political
and social rules of which they complain. ' 343 Although I will concede
that homosexuals have not suffered from as much systematic, overt op-
pression or exclusion as have blacks (if only because their trait is not
readily observable), I still see more than enough suppression to warrant
judicial intervention. Fourth, I agree with Monaghan that the country is
probably better off if the Court primarily relies on a mix of stare decisis
and originalism. My reason, alas, is primarily premised upon "cyni-
cism."' 3 "4 As the Court grows increasingly conservative, I find judicial
restraint increasingly attractive.345 Finally, Monaghan periodically en-
gages in the sort of reasoning that this Article endorses. Monaghan con-
cedes that precedent and original intent are only factors to be weighed;
prior decisions should be overruled if they would generate sufficiently
adverse consequences.346
Professor Schauer begins his defense of precedent by demonstrating
its "fairness" in treating equally different claimants at different times.347
Yet this "golden rule" of temporal equality should not carry as much
weight for government branches. They are not human beings, but ser-
vants of human beings. Governmental structures have no innate dignity
that is insulted by knowing that someone else, or even they, were treated
differently at a different time. Admittedly some within a given bureau-
cracy may be angered, but that outrage is not the same as stripping an
individual of a right. Government branches have less need for predict-
343. Monaghan, supra note 328, at 761.
344. Carter, supra note 285, at 120.
345. One of the dilemmas modem liberals face when they critique the Court is between
suggesting "ideal" doctrine and acknowledging the increasingly hostile power of the Court.
Any "ideal" doctrine, which will probably contain a significant degree of judicial activism,
may be counterproductive in a conservative era. Nevertheless, I believe liberals should con-
tinue to propose counterdoctrine. Thus, this piece is a bit schizophrenic. It recommends a
constitutional methodology that might theoretically be better but might practically be worse,
given the current makeup of the Court. Context may be all, but liberals still need to suggest
alternative conceptions of the Constitution.
346. Monaghan, supra note 328, at 760. Monaghan offers a fascinating example: "Even if
one assumes [the War Powers Resolution] is unconstitutional as a matter of original intent, the
Presidency's accumulation of power and the consequent deterioration of Congress' ability to
check the President's warmaking powers may suggest that the resolution should now be up-
held by the Supreme Court." Id. at 739 n.100. Even originalism, unencumbered by stare
decisis, would not prevail over Monaghan's judgment that the President currently has too
much power. But sometime during the next fifty years, Congress might have too much power.
Consequently, the Court should never consider as inviolate any decision that it someday may
make about the War Powers Act, no matter what interpretive arguments were or were not
employed in the initial decision.
347. Schauer, supra note 327, at 595-97.
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ability than individuals because they have no personal reliance interest or
expectations that will be shocked by an alteration in law. The distinction
between structural issues, the "rights" of government branches, and indi-
vidual rights34 is also influenced by that ultimately elusive concept,
"natural law." The distinction is based upon the assumption that some
human rights are immutable, resistant to cries of necessity or changed
circumstances. 349 The temporal aspect of stare decisis supports not just
the equal treatment of different parties over time, but also the consistent
treatment of a single individual over time.35 °
Formulating separation-of-powers doctrine and weighing prior deci-
sions in the light of political realities has a respectable Supreme Court
pedigree. In the Steel Seizure Case,a51 Justice Jackson openly engaged in
the type of analysis this Article recommends:
As to whether there is imperative necessity for such powers, it
is relevant to note the gap that exists between the President's paper
powers and his real powers .... Vast accretions of federal power,
eroded from that reserved by the States, have magnified the scope
of presidential activity .... No other personality in public life can
begin to compete with him in access to the public mind through
modem methods of communications .... Moreover, rise of the
party system has made a significant extraconstitutional supplement
to real executive power. 2
In other cases, the Court's debate over the Tenth Amendment also
contains candid assessments of current balances of power. Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority 353 is peppered with political assessments: "The expansion and in-
tegration of the national economy brought with it a coordinate expansion
in the scope of national problems.... The last two decades have seen an
unprecedented growth of federal regulatory activity, as the majority itself
348. Professor Carter uses the same distinction when recommending how the Court ought
to interpret structural cases. He argues that the Court ought to use an "originalist" jurispru-
dence, highly deferential to history and to text, for structural cases, but should use a more
evolutionary "natural law" approach to human rights issues. Carter, supra note 285, at 118.
349. This doctrine may generate a "paradoxical" result. Although the Court should theo-
retically give less weight to precedent in structural cases, structural cases probably will rarely
be reversed because they are infrequent, relatively uncontroversial, and difficult to assess in
terms of their tyrannical impact. Furthermore, one hopes the basic constitutional structure
and the institutions it has created will prevent any crisis that would justify the sort of judicial
counterattack I envision.
350. If, for instance, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), were overruled, many women
might wonder why some have a "fundamental right" to an abortion while others do not, as
well as why they personally once had that right but now have lost it.
351. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
352. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 653-54 (Jackson, J., concurring).
353. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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acknowledges." '354
The Court has a history of altering its structural decisions. One
should not be too disturbed, therefore, by the Supreme Court's vacilla-
tion over the Tenth Amendment. Justice Blackmun, who held the swing
vote in Garcia, properly downgraded precedent, including his own earlier
opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery,3 " which advocated a bal-
ancing test. Blackmun's switch typifies the decision this Article recom-
mends, yet Blackmun never really answered O'Connor's claim that the
states were in fact becoming political cripples. His reasoning was too
legalistic, too abstract. He concluded that the Court could not create
coherent judicial standards to defend the states and that the states had
sufficient protection through the Constitution's basic structure: "state
sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safe-
guards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially
created limitations on federal power." '35 6 Such process arguments are
powerful, but they should never remain immune from re-examination if
the federal government were ever to engage in substantive abuse.357
Candid judicial assessments of the current allocation of judicial
power serve collateral purposes. Political appraisals inevitably color ju-
dicial doctrine, consciously and unconsciously. The citizenry needs to
know what judgments have been made so that we can make a more in-
formed evaluation of an opinion's premises and of the fit between its
premises and the judge's conclusions.358 For example, one might disa-
gree with Justice O'Connor's conclusions in Garcia that the states have
become politically feeble, that they have become so weak they need judi-
cial assistance, and/or that they need judicial protection in the particular
case. In any event, the debate should significantly address the relation-
ship of law to actual political realities, not solely a set of abstractions.
354. Id. at 583-87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
355. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
356. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552.
357. Quoting Frankfurter, Blackmun left an opening for continued review if Congress be-
gan to abuse the states:
The process of constitutional adjudication does not thrive on conjuring up horrible
possibilities that never happen in the real world and devising doctrines sufficiently
comprehensive in detail to cover the remotest contingency. Nor need we go beyond
what is required for a reasoned disposition of the kind of controversy now before the
Court.
Id. at 556 (quoting New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 (1946)).
358. Professor Monaghan also argues that the Court needs to preserve its "legitimacy,"
particularly with the "reasoning classes." The reasoning class may be more reassured if they
know that the Court will maintain its commitment to separation of powers by making periodic
assessments of the actual balances of power instead of being overly bound either by prior
decisions or elaborate theories. Monaghan, supra note 328.
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V. Conclusion
Analysis of the British constitution supports this Article's claim that
the processes of elections, appointments, and removals significantly de-
fine a constitutional structure. That conclusion reinforces the Article's
proposed presumption against commingling principal officials in criminal
law matters.
The lessons of the British constitution extend far beyond the precise
issues raised in Young, Morrison, and Mistretta. Broadly, examining an-
other country's constitutional structure demonstrates the roles of tradi-
tion, history, and culture in constitutional law. A constitutional lawyer
can better see how and why every constitution is organic; alterations in
one part will influence other parts. For instance, if Congress has the
unreviewable power to impeach the President for failure to prosecute, it
has less need for a special prosecutor. Similarly, Britain probably should
not adopt a Bill of Rights giving more power to the judiciary as long as
only the Prime Minister and the Lord Chancellor make judicial appoint-
ments. Parliamentary review of appointments would remain inadequate
if the Whips continue to control the majority and if backbenchers know
that their primary route to power and glory is through loyalty to the
government.
The history of the British constitution undercuts the apocalyptic
formalists' warnings of disaster in every balancing test and commingling
of powers.3 5 9 The casual British system has lasted for centuries without
becoming tyrannical; the drift toward a fluid "Anglican" constitution
need not be catastrophic. Powers can be radically redistributed and con-
centrated without inevitably producing authoritarianism. Certainly the
American system continues to survive numerous judicial balancing tests,
as well as a few formal requirements. The constitutional text will proba-
bly prevent complete concentration of powers. The three recent Supreme
Court appointments decisions can be partially defended by the argument
that as long as Bowsher v. Synar3 ° and Buckley v. Valeo 6 1 prevent Con-
gress from placing its own people in positions of executive or judicial
power, Congress can never gain the type of power that the British Prime
Minister has obtained, much less that of a true tyrant. The Bow-
359. Neither tyranny nor anarchy will arise solely because five formalistic justices err in
considering a governmental power "legislative" instead of "judicial." See Strauss, Was There
a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Case, 1983
DUKE L.J. 798, 798-801. Strauss distinguishes legislative vetos over governmental issues from
legislative vetos over the rights of private individuals, finding the former constitutional. Id. at
819.
360. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
361. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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sher/Buckley restriction arguably provides sufficient protection against
legislative tyranny. Third, flexibility and adaptability are essential con-
stitutional traits, as the British constitution so powerfully proves.
This Article has never claimed to completely "defeat" such counter-
arguments. Rather, it has conveyed the author's increasing uneasiness
about recent separation-of-powers decisions, a discomfort that was inten-
sified by studying and teaching the British constitution while in England.
The Article has simultaneously expressed wariness over Justice Scalia's
ambitious attempts to substitute an expansive formal theory of separation
of powers.
Like the Supreme Court, this Article alternates between formal and
fluid solutions. Legal formalism provides direction and clarity in this
country's diverse culture. This is an opportune point in constitutional
history to create a presumption toward text with respect to appointments
of principals with criminal law responsibilities. There remains anxiety,
however, about making the Constitution too rigid; the Court must be
willing to change its mind if its earlier decisions lead to dangerous con-
centrations of power. Most justices may not be as willing as Justice
Blackmun was in Garcia362 to change their positions explicitly, much less
to ground the shift on changes in the balance of power. Yet the gradual
alteration of doctrine in response to shifts in power and ever-changing
needs best describes how the Court has decided cases over time, even if
such fluidity does not describe the thinking of most justices, who are
wedded to internal consistency. The wisdom of the institution may be
far greater than the wisdom of any of the justices or their critics.
Constitutional law entails a great deal of mystery and guesswork.
The Supreme Court's increasingly casual approach to separation-of-pow-
ers cases may not prove to be seriously detrimental to freedom. It is
impossible to prove the following two negatives: that American people
would have been tyrannized363 or that they will be tyrannized without a
362. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
363. This Article has focused on tyranny because many academic pieces appear to offer
complete solutions at a lower level of abstraction, whether it be textualism, originalism, polit-
ical accountability, process, positivism, deference, consent, efficiency, or legitimacy. Those
lower levels may be more practical devices for organizing and evaluating cases, but they should
not be conceived as ultimate "ends." They are only means to the Framers' primary end of
creating and maintaining a free country. By now, the reader may have noticed that this Arti-
cle is not grounded on any intermediate theory, which partially explains the author's fascina-
tion with the ad hoe, experiential British constitution. The appointments and removals issues
present unique considerations; I feel free to apply a different blend of arguments and tech-
niques to other situations, even within the separation-of-powers context. After all, one cannot
be sure which technique is appropriate until one assesses the overall balance of power, an
assessment that will change as the Court hands down new decisions and as the political climate
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significant degree of separation of powers. But those two negatives are
not worth testing.
evolves. Perhaps Holmes' "experience" is the closest I can come to offering a standard: "The
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." O.W. HOLMES, supra note 22, at 1.
Experience is located at a very high level of abstraction. It prevails over the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers; powers must be blended and co-coordinated as well as separated. Admittedly,
the term "experience" is vague, perhaps even more so than "tyranny." Nevertheless, citing
Holmes is never a bad way to end an article.
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